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• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/527  + (one of the two types of other-eliminator that is an affirming negative (ma yin dgag gi gzhan sel); the other is other-eliminator that is a mind (blo'i gzhan sel))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/543  + (one of the two types of other-eliminator that is an affirming negative (ma yin dgag gi gzhan sel); the other is other-eliminator that is a mind (blo'i gzhan sel))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1725  + (one of the two types of paths of release of a Hearer's path of meditation; the other is: done in terms of a person who has simultaneous objects of abandonment (spang bya cig char ba'i dbang du byas pa))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1724  + (one of the two types of paths of release of a Hearer's path of meditation; the other is: done in terms of a person who has gradual objects of abandonment (spang bya rim gyis pa'i dbang du byas pa))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1303  + (one of the two types of permanent phenomena (rtag pa); the other is: permanent phenomenon that abides all the time (dus brtan pa'i rtag pa))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1908  + (one of the two types of permanent phenomenon; the other is permanent phenomenon whose occurrence is not possible (yin pa mi srid pa'i rtag pa) an illustration is: object of knowledge (shes bya))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/722  + (one of the two types of prime cognizer (tshad ma); the other is prime cognizer for which ascertainment is induced from itself (rang las nges kyi tshad ma))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1275  + (one of the two types of prime cognizer; the other is: prime cognizer that induces ascertainment from another (gzhan las nges kyi tshad ma))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1469  + (one of the two types of subsequent cognizer (bcad shes); the other is direct subsequent cognizer (mngon sum bcad shes, pratyakSa-paricchinna-jJAna))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1430  + (one of the types of Proponents of Mind-Only (sems tsam pa, citta-mAtrin); for others see: [[sems tsam pa]])
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1429  + (one of the types of Proponents of Mind-Only (sems tsam pa, citta-mAtrin); for others see: [[sems tsam pa]])
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/155  + (one of the types of knowledge and awareness (blo rig) according to the sevenfold division; for others see: [[blo rig]])
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/545  + (one of the types of knowledge and awareness according to the threefold division)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1909  + (permanent phenomenon whose occurence is no … permanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible; Comment: There are two types of permanent phenomenon: permanent phenomenon whose occurence is possible (yin pa srid pa'i rtag pa), an illustration of which is the two, permanent and [functioning] thing (rtag dngos gnyis); and permanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible, an illustration of which is not possible, an illustration of which is)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/316  + (potent creative cause; Comment: This is one of the two types of creative cause: potent creative cause (byed rgyu nus ldan)and importent creative cause (byed rgyu nus med).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/170  + (predispositions of the view of self; Comme … predispositions of the view of self; Comment: There are four types of predispositions in Ge-luk-b#a explanations of Mind-Only (sems tsam): predispositions of [perceptions of] similar type (rigs mthun gyi bag chags); predispositions of verbalization (mngon brjod kyi bag chags, abhilApavAsanA); predispositions of the view of self (bdag lta'i bag chags, AtmadRStivAsanA); predispositions of the branches of cyclic existence (srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/62  + (production in three types; Comment: This i … production in three types; Comment: This is one of the three assertions concerning mental direct perceptions indicated on this occasion (skabs 'dir bstan gyi yid mngon): production only at the end of a continuum (rgyun mtha' kho nar skye ba); alternating production (spel mar skye ba); and production in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).n in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1342  + (production only at the end of a continuum; … production only at the end of a continuum; Comment: This is one of the three assertions concerning mental direct perceptions indicated on this occasion (skabs 'dir bstan gyi yid mngon): production only at the end of a continuum (rgyun mtha' kho nar skye ba); alternating production (spel mar skye ba); and production in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).n in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1479  + (rtsa nyon; Comment: For the six types, see rtsa nyon.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1119  + (same entity; Comment: This is one of the three types of sameness (gcig pa): same entity (ngo bo gcig pa); same self-isolate (rang ldog gcig pa); same type (rigs gcig pa).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1355  + (same type; Comment: This is one of the three types of sameness (gcig pa): same entity (ngo bo gcig pa); same self-isolate (rang ldog gcig pa); same type (rigs gcig pa).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1235  + (self-isolate; one of the four types of iso … self-isolate; one of the four types of isolates; for others see: ldog paComment: The term "self-isolate" (rang ldog) is a similarly convenient way of referring just to the object itself, pot, and not any of illustrations, such as a copper pot, or its definition., such as a copper pot, or its definition.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1773  + (the two types of proponents of the Middle Way School (mAdhyamika)\nI added English to English (T))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1351  + (these are: knowledge of the past lives of oneself and others; supernatural insight into future mortal conditions; and knowledge that one has overcome all afflictions and that this is one's final birth\nWhat's the Tibetan for these? (T))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/727  + (view of the basal state; Comment: "The view of the basal state" is in contrast to "the view in the face of knowledge" (rig ngo lta ba) — the latter being the state of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness.)

• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1022  + (one of the seven types of knowledge and awareness (blo rig); for others, see blo rig)

• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1340  + (Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer; Com … Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer; Comment: This is one of the eight types of enterers and abiders (zhugs gnas brgyad): Approacher to Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs 'bras gnas); Approacher to Once Returner (phyir 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Once Returner (phyir 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Never Returner (phyir mi 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (phyir mi 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Foe Destroyer (dgra bcom zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (dgra bcom 'bras gnas). For the Sanskrit see the individual entries.r the Sanskrit see the individual entries.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1339  + (Approacher to Stream Enterer; Comment: Thi … Approacher to Stream Enterer; Comment: This is one of the eight types of enterers and abiders (zhugs gnas brgyad): Approacher to Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs 'bras gnas); Approacher to Once Returner (phyir 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Once Returner (phyir 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Never Returner (phyir mi 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (phyir mi 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Foe Destroyer (dgra bcom zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (dgra bcom 'bras gnas). For the Sanskrit see the individual entries.r the Sanskrit see the individual entries.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1502  + (Buddha-qualities are the knowledge, attainments, methods, and teachings associated with a Buddha)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/914  + (Comment: A definition from Awareness and Knowledge is: a phenomenon that limited beings must realize definitively in dependence on a sign (tshur mthong rnams kyis thog mar rtags la brten nas nges par rtogs dgos pa'i chos).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/671  + (Comment: A non-Buddhist school renowned in … Comment: A non-Buddhist school renowned in Buddhist texts as the precursor of all Indian systems and so called due to the belief that liberation can be gained through thoroughly understanding the enumeration of twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge which principally involves distinguishing between mind and twentt-four categories of matter.mind and twentt-four categories of matter.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/765  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/770  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1244  + (Comment: An illustration is desire ('dod c … Comment: An illustration is desire ('dod chags). There are six types of causes: fruitional cause (rnam smin gyi rgyu), co-arisen cause (lhan cig byung ba'i rgyu), creative cause (byed rgyu), cause of similar lot (skal mnyam gyi rgyu), omnipresent cause (kun 'gro'i rgyu), and associational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).ociational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/851  + (Comment: An instance is an inferential cog … Comment: An instance is an inferential cognition which realizes that sound is impermanent (sgra mi rtag rtogs kyi rjes dpag). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/91  + (Comment: An instance of this is a sense co … Comment: An instance of this is a sense consciousness to which the area appears as red in dependence upon the mind's being disturbed by anger (yid zhe sdang gis dkrugs pa la brten nas sa gzhi dmar por snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1041  + (Comment: An instance of this is a conceptu … Comment: An instance of this is a conceptual consciousness wishing for a future object at the present time (de ring gi dus su ma 'ongs pa'i don mngon par 'dod pa'i rtog pa). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/92  + (Comment: An instance of this is a consciou … Comment: An instance of this is a consciousness to which a firebrand wheel appears in dependence upon quickly turning a fire brand ('gal med myur du skor ba la brten nas 'gal med 'khor lor snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/88  + (Comment: An instance of this is a conceptu … Comment: An instance of this is a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent (sgra rtag 'dzin rtog pa). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/89  + (Comment: An instance of this is a sense co … Comment: An instance of this is a sense consciousness to which, in dependence upon the eyes [which are the basis of an eye consciousness] being affected by opthamalia, one moon appears as two (mig rab rib kyis bslad pa la brten nas zla gcig zla gnyis su snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/90  + (Comment: An instance of this is an eye con … Comment: An instance of this is an eye consciousness which, in dependence upon one's abiding in a boat, sees trees as moving (grur zhugs pa la brten nas ljon shing 'gro bar snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1767  + (Comment: Difference can refer merely to no … Comment: Difference can refer merely to nominal difference, such as the difference between bum pa and pot; Examples of different phenomena are (1) the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtags dngos gnyis); these are mutually exclusive ('gal ba) and a dichotomy; (2) the two, object of knowledge and existent (shes bya dang yod pa gnyis); these are equivalent (don gcig) but not one (gcig); (3) the two, pillar and pot (ka bum gnyis); (4) the two, pot and the impermanence of pot (bum pa dang bum pa steng gi mi rtag pa gnyis); these are one entity but different isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1480  + (Comment: For the six types, see rtsa nyon.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/945  + (Comment: Illustrations are (1) object of knowledge (shes bya); (2) the two: permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); (3) uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1250  + (Comment: In the GuhyasamAja system of High … Comment: In the GuhyasamAja system of Highest Yoga Tantra as presented in NAgArjuna's Five Stages (rim pa lnga pa, paJcakrama), conceptual consciousnesses are detailed as of eighty types, divided into three classes. The first group of thirty-three is composed of conceptual consciousnesses that involve a strong movement of "wind" to their objects. They include conceptions such as fear, attachment, hunger, thirst, compassion, acquisitiveness, and jealousy. The second group of forty conceptions is composed of conceptual consciousnesses that involve a medium movement of "wind" to their objects — conceptions such as joy, amazement, generosity, desiring to kiss, heroism, non-gentleness, and crookedness. The third group of seven conceptions involve a weak movement of "wind" to their objects — forgetfulness, mistake as in apprehending water in a mirage, catatonia, depression, laziness, doubt, and equal desire and hatred. The three groups represent, on the ordinary level of consciousness, increasingly less dualistic perception; it is clear that in the third group the mind is strongly withdrawn. They are called "indicative" because, for someone who has not experienced the three subtler levels of consciousness--mind of vivid white appearance, mind of vivid red or organge increase, and mind of black near-attainment (so called because it is near to manifesting the mind of clear light), these indicate what these consciousnesses are like.icate what these consciousnesses are like.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/506  + (Comment: In the SUtra School and above, il … Comment: In the SUtra School and above, illustrations of phenomena which are non-things, that is to say, which exist but do not perform the function of creating effects, are object of knowledge (shes bya); the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').ounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/614  + (Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymolo … Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymologized this is "full-fall", i.e., one who is filled with the afflictions and has fallen into cyclic existence. As he said, this is not true of all persons, because even a Buddha, for instance, is a person. It is to be noted that animals, for instance, are persons. It is said that in general "self" (bdag, Atman) "person," and "I" (nga, ahaM) are equivalent, but in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all equivalent and do not at all have the same meaning. In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, whereas "persons" refers to existent beings who are the bases with respect to which that refutation is made. All four Buddhist schools, therefore, hold that persons exist; they do not claim that persons are mere fictions of ignorance. The schools hold differing opinions on the nature of the person. According to Ge-luk-b#a scholars, all except the Middle Way Consequence School posit something from within the bases of imputation of a person — usually either mind or the collection of mind and body — as being the person. In contrast, the Consequence School holds that, even though a person is imputed in dependence upon mind and body (in the Formless Realm, a person is imputed in dependence only on mind), the person is neither mind nor body nor a collection of mind and body, since it is just the I that is imputed in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of ChandrakIrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Consequence School, Ge-luk-b#a scholars identify how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) or the collection of them is considered to be the person when sought analytically from among its bases of imputation: the Proponents of the Great Exposition, in general, hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person; however, some of the five SaMmitIya subschools of the Great Exposition School maintain that all five aggregates are the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice) while another subschool, the Avantaka, asserts that the mind alone is the person; the SUtra School Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person; the SUtra School Following Reasoning maintains that the mental consciousness is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Scripture holds that the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, AlayavijJAna) is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning asserts that the mental consciousness is the person; both the Yogic Autonomy School and the SUtra Autonomy School assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is the person. For the most part, the delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not reporting of forthright statements in these schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is often not clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of imputation of a person is the person. Rather, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, persons are merely asserted to be "non-associated compositional factors" (ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaMskAra) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification — of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of imputation — as the person.son's bases of imputation — as the person.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1660  + (Comment: One of the five types of effects; for example, a harvest achieved through the exertions of a farmer (zhing pas rtson pas sgrub pa'i lo tog); for other effects see 'bras bu.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/777  + (Comment: One of the four foods, which acco … Comment: One of the four foods, which according to (1) morsel food (kham gyi zas, kavaDaMkAra-AhAra), (2) contact food (reg pa'i zas, sparza-AhAra) which is contaminated touch that increases the great elements associated with the sense powers, (3) intention food (sems pa'i zas, manaHsaMcetanAhAra) which is intention (or attention) that involves hope for a desired object, and (4) consciousness food (rnam shes kyi zas, vijJAna-AhAra) which is the collections of consciousness. S#er-s#hül L#o-sang-pün-tsok (Notes, 13b.5) cites the third chapter of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Manifest Knowledge (III.119-128) which indicates that:\n* coarse food furthers the body that is the support of this lifetime\n* contact furthers the mind that depends on the support of the body\n* intention projects future lifetimes (in that it is the main feature of karma)\n* the karmas that actualize future lifetimes in the sense of filling in the details of the lifetime projected by intention are posited as consciousness.\nS#er-s#hül quotes Vasubandhu's explanation that morsel food exists only in the Desire Realm whereas the other three exist in all three realms—Desire, Form, and Formless—and are necessarily contaminated. As Ge-s#hay B#el-den-drak-b#a explained, the foods increase cyclic existence, and thus uncontaminated contact, intention, and consciousness are not posited as food. S#er-s#hül paraphrases AsaGga's Compendium of Ascertainments which explains that although meditative absorptions and engaging in pure behavior are means of furthering the body through eliminating unfavorable circumstances, they are not posited as foods since they do not further the body by way of their own entities. His point must be that meditative stabilization therefore should not be included in the list.\n Contrary to this, Geshe Gedün Lodrö of the University of Hamburg includes meditative stabilization (ting nge 'dzin) and gives mental food as the second (Calm Abiding and Special Insight, 70-71):\n"The four types of nourishment are (1) coarse food, (2) mental nourishment, (3) nourishment of intention, and (4) nourishment of consciousness. The sense of mental satisfaction that comes when a desire is fulfilled is called mental nourishment. Just as coarse food nourishes the body, so satisfaction nourishes or replenishes the mind upon fulfillment of a desire. The third type, nourishment of intention, is an action that projects the next lifetime. Since it generates or produces the next lifetime, it is called a nourisher, or nourishment; it is the second link of the twelve-linked dependent-arising. Similarly, the third link, which is called consciousness, is known as the food of consciousness. Just as the action that projects, or impels, a future lifetime is called a nourisher, so the consciousness which is imprinted with that action and which will at the time of the effect of that action in the future life be imprinted with other karmas is called a nourisher, or nourishment. Why is [the first link of dependent-arising,] ignorance, not called a nourisher? It is because ignorance is the agent that pervades everything; thus, it is not singled out as a nourisher. There is still another type of nourishment, that of meditative stabilization. Persons who have achieved calm abiding and special insight and have proceeded to high levels of the path do not need to use coarse food; they have the nourishment of meditative stabilization.e nourishment of meditative stabilization.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/52  + (Comment: One of the four types of normative Check Kathy pervasion (khyab pa rnal ma bzhi); an illustration of this type of reasoning is: Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily not permanent (mtshon bya yin na / rtag pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathy)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/53  + (Comment: One of the four types of perverse … Comment: One of the four types of perverse pervasions (khyab pa phyin ci log bzhi); an illustration of this type of reasoning is: whatever is a definiendum is necessarily not not-permanent (mtshon bya yin na / rtag pa ma yin pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathyma yin pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathy)