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A list of all pages that have property "english-comment" with value "one of the three types of knowledge and awareness (blo rig) according to the threefold spanision". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

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  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/199  + (one of the two types of other-eliminators that are affirming negatives (ma yin dgag gi gzhan sel); the other is don rang mtshan gyi gzhan sel)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/543  + (one of the two types of other-eliminator that is an affirming negative (ma yin dgag gi gzhan sel); the other is other-eliminator that is a mind (blo'i gzhan sel))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1725  + (one of the two types of paths of release of a Hearer's path of meditation; the other is: done in terms of a person who has simultaneous objects of abandonment (spang bya cig char ba'i dbang du byas pa))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1724  + (one of the two types of paths of release of a Hearer's path of meditation; the other is: done in terms of a person who has gradual objects of abandonment (spang bya rim gyis pa'i dbang du byas pa))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1303  + (one of the two types of permanent phenomena (rtag pa); the other is: permanent phenomenon that abides all the time (dus brtan pa'i rtag pa))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1908  + (one of the two types of permanent phenomenon; the other is permanent phenomenon whose occurrence is not possible (yin pa mi srid pa'i rtag pa) an illustration is: object of knowledge (shes bya))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/722  + (one of the two types of prime cognizer (tshad ma); the other is prime cognizer for which ascertainment is induced from itself (rang las nges kyi tshad ma))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1275  + (one of the two types of prime cognizer; the other is: prime cognizer that induces ascertainment from another (gzhan las nges kyi tshad ma))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1469  + (one of the two types of subsequent cognizer (bcad shes); the other is direct subsequent cognizer (mngon sum bcad shes, pratyakSa-paricchinna-jJAna))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1430  + (one of the types of Proponents of Mind-Only (sems tsam pa, citta-mAtrin); for others see: [[sems tsam pa]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1429  + (one of the types of Proponents of Mind-Only (sems tsam pa, citta-mAtrin); for others see: [[sems tsam pa]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/545  + (one of the types of knowledge and awareness according to the threefold division)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/155  + (one of the types of knowledge and awareness (blo rig) according to the sevenfold division; for others see: [[blo rig]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1909  + (permanent phenomenon whose occurence is nopermanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible; Comment: There are two types of permanent phenomenon: permanent phenomenon whose occurence is possible (yin pa srid pa'i rtag pa), an illustration of which is the two, permanent and [functioning] thing (rtag dngos gnyis); and permanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible, an illustration of which is not possible, an illustration of which is)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/316  + (potent creative cause; Comment: This is one of the two types of creative cause: potent creative cause (byed rgyu nus ldan)and importent creative cause (byed rgyu nus med).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/170  + (predispositions of the view of self; Commepredispositions of the view of self; Comment: There are four types of predispositions in Ge-luk-b#a explanations of Mind-Only (sems tsam): predispositions of [perceptions of] similar type (rigs mthun gyi bag chags); predispositions of verbalization (mngon brjod kyi bag chags, abhilApavAsanA); predispositions of the view of self (bdag lta'i bag chags, AtmadRStivAsanA); predispositions of the branches of cyclic existence (srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/62  + (production in three types; Comment: This iproduction in three types; Comment: This is one of the three assertions concerning mental direct perceptions indicated on this occasion (skabs 'dir bstan gyi yid mngon): production only at the end of a continuum (rgyun mtha' kho nar skye ba); alternating production (spel mar skye ba); and production in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).n in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1342  + (production only at the end of a continuum;production only at the end of a continuum; Comment: This is one of the three assertions concerning mental direct perceptions indicated on this occasion (skabs 'dir bstan gyi yid mngon): production only at the end of a continuum (rgyun mtha' kho nar skye ba); alternating production (spel mar skye ba); and production in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).n in three types ('gros gsum par skye ba).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1479  + (rtsa nyon; Comment: For the six types, see rtsa nyon.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1119  + (same entity; Comment: This is one of the three types of sameness (gcig pa): same entity (ngo bo gcig pa); same self-isolate (rang ldog gcig pa); same type (rigs gcig pa).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1355  + (same type; Comment: This is one of the three types of sameness (gcig pa): same entity (ngo bo gcig pa); same self-isolate (rang ldog gcig pa); same type (rigs gcig pa).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1235  + (self-isolate; one of the four types of isoself-isolate; one of the four types of isolates; for others see: ldog paComment: The term "self-isolate" (rang ldog) is a similarly convenient way of referring just to the object itself, pot, and not any of illustrations, such as a copper pot, or its definition., such as a copper pot, or its definition.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1773  + (the two types of proponents of the Middle Way School (mAdhyamika)\nI added English to English (T))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1351  + (these are: knowledge of the past lives of oneself and others; supernatural insight into future mortal conditions; and knowledge that one has overcome all afflictions and that this is one's final birth\nWhat's the Tibetan for these? (T))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/727  + (view of the basal state; Comment: "The view of the basal state" is in contrast to "the view in the face of knowledge" (rig ngo lta ba) — the latter being the state of meditative equipoise directly realizing emptiness.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1340  + (Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer; ComAbider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer; Comment: This is one of the eight types of enterers and abiders (zhugs gnas brgyad): Approacher to Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs 'bras gnas); Approacher to Once Returner (phyir 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Once Returner (phyir 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Never Returner (phyir mi 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (phyir mi 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Foe Destroyer (dgra bcom zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (dgra bcom 'bras gnas). For the Sanskrit see the individual entries.r the Sanskrit see the individual entries.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1339  + (Approacher to Stream Enterer; Comment: ThiApproacher to Stream Enterer; Comment: This is one of the eight types of enterers and abiders (zhugs gnas brgyad): Approacher to Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Stream Enterer (rgyun zhugs 'bras gnas); Approacher to Once Returner (phyir 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of Once Returner (phyir 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Never Returner (phyir mi 'ong zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (phyir mi 'ong 'bras gnas); Approacher to Foe Destroyer (dgra bcom zhugs pa); Abider in the Fruit of (dgra bcom 'bras gnas). For the Sanskrit see the individual entries.r the Sanskrit see the individual entries.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1502  + (Buddha-qualities are the knowledge, attainments, methods, and teachings associated with a Buddha)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/914  + (Comment: A definition from Awareness and Knowledge is: a phenomenon that limited beings must realize definitively in dependence on a sign (tshur mthong rnams kyis thog mar rtags la brten nas nges par rtogs dgos pa'i chos).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/671  + (Comment: A non-Buddhist school renowned inComment: A non-Buddhist school renowned in Buddhist texts as the precursor of all Indian systems and so called due to the belief that liberation can be gained through thoroughly understanding the enumeration of twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge which principally involves distinguishing between mind and twentt-four categories of matter.mind and twentt-four categories of matter.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/814  + (Comment: A type of non-observation of a related object suitable to appear which itself is a division of non-observation signs of the suitable to appear.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/765  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/770  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1244  + (Comment: An illustration is desire ('dod cComment: An illustration is desire ('dod chags). There are six types of causes: fruitional cause (rnam smin gyi rgyu), co-arisen cause (lhan cig byung ba'i rgyu), creative cause (byed rgyu), cause of similar lot (skal mnyam gyi rgyu), omnipresent cause (kun 'gro'i rgyu), and associational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).ociational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/851  + (Comment: An instance is an inferential cogComment: An instance is an inferential cognition which realizes that sound is impermanent (sgra mi rtag rtogs kyi rjes dpag). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/92  + (Comment: An instance of this is a consciouComment: An instance of this is a consciousness to which a firebrand wheel appears in dependence upon quickly turning a fire brand ('gal med myur du skor ba la brten nas 'gal med 'khor lor snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/88  + (Comment: An instance of this is a conceptuComment: An instance of this is a conceptual consciousness apprehending sound as permanent (sgra rtag 'dzin rtog pa). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1041  + (Comment: An instance of this is a conceptuComment: An instance of this is a conceptual consciousness wishing for a future object at the present time (de ring gi dus su ma 'ongs pa'i don mngon par 'dod pa'i rtog pa). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).erception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/89  + (Comment: An instance of this is a sense coComment: An instance of this is a sense consciousness to which, in dependence upon the eyes [which are the basis of an eye consciousness] being affected by opthamalia, one moon appears as two (mig rab rib kyis bslad pa la brten nas zla gcig zla gnyis su snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/90  + (Comment: An instance of this is an eye conComment: An instance of this is an eye consciousness which, in dependence upon one's abiding in a boat, sees trees as moving (grur zhugs pa la brten nas ljon shing 'gro bar snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/91  + (Comment: An instance of this is a sense coComment: An instance of this is a sense consciousness to which the area appears as red in dependence upon the mind's being disturbed by anger (yid zhe sdang gis dkrugs pa la brten nas sa gzhi dmar por snang ba'i dbang shes). This is one of the seven types of facsimiles of direct perception (mngon sum ltar snang): mistaken conceptions ('khrul ba'i rtog pa), conventional conceptions (kun rdzob kyi rtog pa), inferential conceptions (rjes dpag gi rtog pa), conceptions arisen from inference (rjes dpag las byung ba'i rtog pa), memory conceptions (dran pa'i rtog pa), wishing conceptions (mngon 'dod kyi rtog pa), and non-conceptual facsimilies of direct perception (rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). Among these, this is one of the four non-conceptual facsimiles check Kathy: bogus/fake? of direct perception which are sense consciousnesses (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang). gyur pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1767  + (Comment: Difference can refer merely to noComment: Difference can refer merely to nominal difference, such as the difference between bum pa and pot; Examples of different phenomena are (1) the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtags dngos gnyis); these are mutually exclusive ('gal ba) and a dichotomy; (2) the two, object of knowledge and existent (shes bya dang yod pa gnyis); these are equivalent (don gcig) but not one (gcig); (3) the two, pillar and pot (ka bum gnyis); (4) the two, pot and the impermanence of pot (bum pa dang bum pa steng gi mi rtag pa gnyis); these are one entity but different isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1480  + (Comment: For the six types, see rtsa nyon.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/945  + (Comment: Illustrations are (1) object of knowledge (shes bya); (2) the two: permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); (3) uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1250  + (Comment: In the GuhyasamAja system of HighComment: In the GuhyasamAja system of Highest Yoga Tantra as presented in NAgArjuna's Five Stages (rim pa lnga pa, paJcakrama), conceptual consciousnesses are detailed as of eighty types, divided into three classes. The first group of thirty-three is composed of conceptual consciousnesses that involve a strong movement of "wind" to their objects. They include conceptions such as fear, attachment, hunger, thirst, compassion, acquisitiveness, and jealousy. The second group of forty conceptions is composed of conceptual consciousnesses that involve a medium movement of "wind" to their objects — conceptions such as joy, amazement, generosity, desiring to kiss, heroism, non-gentleness, and crookedness. The third group of seven conceptions involve a weak movement of "wind" to their objects — forgetfulness, mistake as in apprehending water in a mirage, catatonia, depression, laziness, doubt, and equal desire and hatred. The three groups represent, on the ordinary level of consciousness, increasingly less dualistic perception; it is clear that in the third group the mind is strongly withdrawn. They are called "indicative" because, for someone who has not experienced the three subtler levels of consciousness--mind of vivid white appearance, mind of vivid red or organge increase, and mind of black near-attainment (so called because it is near to manifesting the mind of clear light), these indicate what these consciousnesses are like.icate what these consciousnesses are like.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/506  + (Comment: In the SUtra School and above, ilComment: In the SUtra School and above, illustrations of phenomena which are non-things, that is to say, which exist but do not perform the function of creating effects, are object of knowledge (shes bya); the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').ounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1527  + (Comment: In the division into four, the fiComment: In the division into four, the first refers to the mind-generations of the paths of accumulation (tshogs lam) and preparation (sbyor lam), the second to the mind-generations of the first seven grounds of Bodhisattva Superiors, the third to the mind-generations of the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds of Bodhisattva Superiors, and the fourth to the mind-generations of Buddhas.fourth to the mind-generations of Buddhas.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/614  + (Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymoloComment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymologized this is "full-fall", i.e., one who is filled with the afflictions and has fallen into cyclic existence. As he said, this is not true of all persons, because even a Buddha, for instance, is a person. It is to be noted that animals, for instance, are persons. It is said that in general "self" (bdag, Atman) "person," and "I" (nga, ahaM) are equivalent, but in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all equivalent and do not at all have the same meaning. In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, whereas "persons" refers to existent beings who are the bases with respect to which that refutation is made. All four Buddhist schools, therefore, hold that persons exist; they do not claim that persons are mere fictions of ignorance. The schools hold differing opinions on the nature of the person. According to Ge-luk-b#a scholars, all except the Middle Way Consequence School posit something from within the bases of imputation of a person — usually either mind or the collection of mind and body — as being the person. In contrast, the Consequence School holds that, even though a person is imputed in dependence upon mind and body (in the Formless Realm, a person is imputed in dependence only on mind), the person is neither mind nor body nor a collection of mind and body, since it is just the I that is imputed in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of ChandrakIrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Consequence School, Ge-luk-b#a scholars identify how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) or the collection of them is considered to be the person when sought analytically from among its bases of imputation: the Proponents of the Great Exposition, in general, hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person; however, some of the five SaMmitIya subschools of the Great Exposition School maintain that all five aggregates are the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice) while another subschool, the Avantaka, asserts that the mind alone is the person; the SUtra School Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person; the SUtra School Following Reasoning maintains that the mental consciousness is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Scripture holds that the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, AlayavijJAna) is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning asserts that the mental consciousness is the person; both the Yogic Autonomy School and the SUtra Autonomy School assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is the person. For the most part, the delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not reporting of forthright statements in these schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is often not clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of imputation of a person is the person. Rather, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, persons are merely asserted to be "non-associated compositional factors" (ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaMskAra) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification — of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of imputation — as the person.son's bases of imputation — as the person.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1579  + (Comment: Not an actual division.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1660  + (Comment: One of the five types of effects; for example, a harvest achieved through the exertions of a farmer (zhing pas rtson pas sgrub pa'i lo tog); for other effects see 'bras bu.)