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This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

List of results

• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1276  + (one of the seven types of isolate phenomenon; for others see: ldog chos; illustrations: (1) non-functioning thing (dngos med); (2) permanent phenomenon (rtag pa); (3) definiendium (mtshon bya))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1002  + (one of the six divisions of ordinary beings (so so'i skye bo, pRthagjana); for others see: see [[dmyal ba'i rten can gyi so so'i skye bo]])
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/986  + (one of the three divisions of knowledge and awareness (blo rig) according to the three-fold division)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1478  + (one of the two divisions of color; the other is: secondary colors (yan lag gi kha dog, aGga-varNa))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/398  + (one of the two divisions of consciousness (shes pa); the other is mental cognition (yid shes))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/421  + (one of the two divisions of form-source (gzugs kyi skye mched, rUpAyatana); the other is color (kha dog))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1211  +
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/984  + (one of the two divisions of negation (dgag … one of the two divisions of negation (dgag pa); the other is: affirming negative (ma yin dgag, paryudAsa-pratiSedha)Comment: The division of negatives, or negations, into affirming and non-affirming, or implicative and non-implicative, is traced to MimAMsA injunctions to refrain from activities that either imply another activity in its place or not. For example, the non-existence of the horns of a rabbit is expressed by the sentence, "The horns of a rabbit do not exist," and this does not suggest anything positive in place of the horns of a rabbit. Though it can suggest another non-affirming negative such as the non-existence of the beauty of the horns of a rabbit, it does not suggest any positive phenomenon in place of its object of negation. In the same way, an emptiness is a non-affirming negative such that the term expressing it does not suggest in place of the negation of its own object of negation another, positive phenomenon. See also "affirming negation" (ma yin dgag).e also "affirming negation" (ma yin dgag).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1290  + (one of the two divisions of one type (rigs gcig); the other is: one isolate type (ldog pa rigs gcig))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/955  + (one of the two divisions of sound-source (sgra'i skye mched, zabdAyatana); the other is: sound arisen from elements conjoined with consciousness (zin pa'i 'byung ba las gyur pa'i sgra, upatta-mahAbhUta-hetuka-zabda))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/15  + (one of the two divisions of tangible object (reg bya, spraSTavya); the other is: tangible object which is an element ('byung bar gyur pa'i reg bya))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/17  + (one of the two divisions of tangible object (reg bya, spraSTavya); the other is: tangible object that is arisen from elements ('byung 'gyur gyi reg bya))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/716  + (other-knower; an other-knower is a consciousness which engages external objects (i.e. objects other than internal consciousnesses))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1350  + (rig gnas; rig gnas chung ba lnga need to be translated SW added divisions, from Tshig mdzod 2 vol. 2682.1; ex. from Ship 61b.3)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1007  + (see: mig shes\nNot sure what divisions mean?? (T))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1235  + (self-isolate; one of the four types of iso … self-isolate; one of the four types of isolates; for others see: ldog paComment: The term "self-isolate" (rang ldog) is a similarly convenient way of referring just to the object itself, pot, and not any of illustrations, such as a copper pot, or its definition., such as a copper pot, or its definition.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1577  + (sound sense-sphere; Comment: This is one o … sound sense-sphere; Comment: This is one of the five divisions of external form (phyi'i gzugs): form sense-sphere (gzugs kyi skye mched); (2) sound sense-sphere (sgra'i skye mched); (3) odor sense-sphere (dri'i skye mched); (4) taste sense-sphere (ro'i skye mched); (5) tangible object sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).bject sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1301  + (tangible object sense-sphere; Comment: Thi … tangible object sense-sphere; Comment: This is one of the five divisions of external form (phyi'i gzugs): form sense-sphere (gzugs kyi skye mched); (2) sound sense-sphere (sgra'i skye mched); (3) odor sense-sphere (dri'i skye mched); (4) taste sense-sphere (ro'i skye mched); (5) tangible object sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).bject sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1454  + (taste sense-sphere; Comment: This is one o … taste sense-sphere; Comment: This is one of the five divisions of external form (phyi'i gzugs): form sense-sphere (gzugs kyi skye mched); (2) sound sense-sphere (sgra'i skye mched); (3) odor sense-sphere (dri'i skye mched); (4) taste sense-sphere (ro'i skye mched); (5) tangible object sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).bject sense-sphere (reg bya'i skye mched).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1738  + (the style of textbook which lays out the subject, definitions, divisions, etc. as opposed to analysis of the scope (mtha' dpyad))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/404  + (the two divisions of consciousness (shes pa))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/952  + (the two divisions of negative (dgag pa, pratiSedha))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1582  + (those whose obstruction is external; Comme … those whose obstruction is external; Comment: This is one of the three divisions of hungry ghost (yi dwags, preta): those whose obstruction is external (sgrib pa phyi na yod pa); those whose obstruction is internal (sgrib pa nang na yod pa); those whose obstructions are both external and internal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).rnal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1580  + (those whose obstruction is internal; Comme … those whose obstruction is internal; Comment: This is one of the three divisions of hungry ghost (yi dwags, preta): those whose obstruction is external (sgrib pa phyi na yod pa); those whose obstruction is internal (sgrib pa nang na yod pa); those whose obstructions are both external and internal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).rnal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1584  + (those whose obstructions are both external … those whose obstructions are both external and internal; Comment: This is one of the three divisions of hungry ghost (yi dwags, preta): those whose obstruction is external (sgrib pa phyi na yod pa); those whose obstruction is internal (sgrib pa nang na yod pa); those whose obstructions are both external and internal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).rnal (sgrib pa phyi nang gnyis ka yod pa).)

• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1211  + (one of the two divisions of matter (bem po); the other being: internal matter (nang gi bem po); illustrations are: (1) pillar (ka ba); (2) pot (bum pa))

• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1849  + ((PH) Jeffrey, Perdue gives divisions as "1) the property of the subject (pakSa-dharma), 2) the forward pervasion (anvaya-vyApti), 3) the counter-pervasion (vyatireka-vyApti)")
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1513  + ((PH) Jeffrey, there are too many entries in the Divisions field)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/478  + ((PH) Tib. divisions too long.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/723  + ((PH) too many divisions)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1006  + (Check divisions (T))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/397  + (Check divisions, I doctored them (T))
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/671  + (Comment: A non-Buddhist school renowned in … Comment: A non-Buddhist school renowned in Buddhist texts as the precursor of all Indian systems and so called due to the belief that liberation can be gained through thoroughly understanding the enumeration of twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge which principally involves distinguishing between mind and twentt-four categories of matter.mind and twentt-four categories of matter.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/822  + (Comment: A subject marker in logical texts … Comment: A subject marker in logical texts. The first example given above is the definition of ldog chos phung sum tsam po ba (isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type), illustrations of which are dgag pa (negative phenomenon), dngos po'i spyi (generality-of-functioning-thing), etc.yi (generality-of-functioning-thing), etc.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/765  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/770  + (Comment: Although pillar-and-pot exists, there is nothing that is both a pillar and a pot; hence, pillar-and-pot is an object of knowledge the being of which does not occur.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1767  + (Comment: Difference can refer merely to no … Comment: Difference can refer merely to nominal difference, such as the difference between bum pa and pot; Examples of different phenomena are (1) the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtags dngos gnyis); these are mutually exclusive ('gal ba) and a dichotomy; (2) the two, object of knowledge and existent (shes bya dang yod pa gnyis); these are equivalent (don gcig) but not one (gcig); (3) the two, pillar and pot (ka bum gnyis); (4) the two, pot and the impermanence of pot (bum pa dang bum pa steng gi mi rtag pa gnyis); these are one entity but different isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).isolates (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/495  + (Comment: Examples of an instance of thing are pot (bum pa) and pillar (ka ba).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/879  + (Comment: Examples of this include wide cat … Comment: Examples of this include wide categories which cannot be tied down to being just matter or just consciousness, such as thing (dngos po), specifically characterized phenomenon (rang mtshan), that which is able to perform a function (don byed nus pa).e to perform a function (don byed nus pa).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/771  + (Comment: For divisions see nye nyon.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/778  + (Comment: For other divisions see khams du ma and khams tha dad pa.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/945  + (Comment: Illustrations are (1) object of knowledge (shes bya); (2) the two: permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); (3) uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1609  + (Comment: Illustrations are (1) pot (bum pa); (2) uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha'); (3) the two, pillar and pot (ka bum gnyis); (4) the two, permanent phenomenon and [functioning] thing (rtag dngos gnyis).)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/502  + (Comment: In Jo-nang non-entities here are imputational natures, which include other-powered natures, and thus are all conventionalities.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/505  + (Comment: In Jo-nang non-entities here are imputational natures, which include other-powered natures, and thus are all conventionalities.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/504  + (Comment: In Jo-nang, this is the emptiness of imputational natures which here include other-powered natures.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/506  + (Comment: In the SUtra School and above, il … Comment: In the SUtra School and above, illustrations of phenomena which are non-things, that is to say, which exist but do not perform the function of creating effects, are object of knowledge (shes bya); the two, permanent and functioning thing (rtag dngos gnyis); uncompounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').ounded space ('dus ma byas kyi nam mkha').)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/614  + (Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymolo … Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymologized this is "full-fall", i.e., one who is filled with the afflictions and has fallen into cyclic existence. As he said, this is not true of all persons, because even a Buddha, for instance, is a person. It is to be noted that animals, for instance, are persons. It is said that in general "self" (bdag, Atman) "person," and "I" (nga, ahaM) are equivalent, but in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all equivalent and do not at all have the same meaning. In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, whereas "persons" refers to existent beings who are the bases with respect to which that refutation is made. All four Buddhist schools, therefore, hold that persons exist; they do not claim that persons are mere fictions of ignorance. The schools hold differing opinions on the nature of the person. According to Ge-luk-b#a scholars, all except the Middle Way Consequence School posit something from within the bases of imputation of a person — usually either mind or the collection of mind and body — as being the person. In contrast, the Consequence School holds that, even though a person is imputed in dependence upon mind and body (in the Formless Realm, a person is imputed in dependence only on mind), the person is neither mind nor body nor a collection of mind and body, since it is just the I that is imputed in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of ChandrakIrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Consequence School, Ge-luk-b#a scholars identify how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) or the collection of them is considered to be the person when sought analytically from among its bases of imputation: the Proponents of the Great Exposition, in general, hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person; however, some of the five SaMmitIya subschools of the Great Exposition School maintain that all five aggregates are the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice) while another subschool, the Avantaka, asserts that the mind alone is the person; the SUtra School Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person; the SUtra School Following Reasoning maintains that the mental consciousness is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Scripture holds that the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, AlayavijJAna) is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning asserts that the mental consciousness is the person; both the Yogic Autonomy School and the SUtra Autonomy School assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is the person. For the most part, the delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not reporting of forthright statements in these schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is often not clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of imputation of a person is the person. Rather, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, persons are merely asserted to be "non-associated compositional factors" (ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaMskAra) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification — of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of imputation — as the person.son's bases of imputation — as the person.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/374  + (Comment: One in the triad of imputational … Comment: One in the triad of imputational form (kun brtags pa'i gzugs), imputed form (rnam par brtags pa'i gzugs), and form of reality (chos nyid kyi gzugs), the last meaning the reality of form in Ge-luk and noumenal form in Jo-nang. These three correspond to the three natures of a form: imputational nature, other-powered nature, and thoroughly established nature of a form.d thoroughly established nature of a form.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1331  + (Comment: One of the five kinds of effects ('bras bu). With respect to the divisions, the first would, for instance, be to kill and to be killed; the second would, for instance, be to kill and then to kill again.)
• Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/622  + (Comment: One of the two divisions of non-associated compositional factors (ldan min 'du byed).)