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A list of all pages that have property "english-comment" with value "one of the two kinds of non-affirming negatives; see: med dgag; an illustration is: the selflessness of persons (gang zag gi bdag med)". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

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  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1265  + (one of the eight objects of negation in the PrAsaGgika system; for others see: [[dgag bya]] (PH) Jeffrey, I added the english for example 2. Check)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/435  + (one of the eight types of object of negation (dgag bya) in the PrAsaGgika system (and one of five in the SvAtantrika system); for others see: [[dgag bya]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/522  + (one of the eight types of object of negation (dgag bya) in the PrAsaGgika system (and one of five in the SvAtantrika system); for others see: [[dgag bya]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/177  + (one of the eight types of object of negation (dgag bya) in the PrAsaGgika system (and one of five in SvAtantrika); for others see: [[dgag bya]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/689  + (one of the five objects of negation (dgag bya) in the SvAtantrika system; for others see: [[dgag bya]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1277  + (one of the four types of concordance; for others see: rjes mthun; illustration: non-isolate phenomenon that is itself (rang yin pa'i ldog chos ma yin pa))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1240  + (one of the four types of concordance; for others see: rjes mthun; illustration: isolate phenomenon that is not itself (rang ma yin pa'i ldog chos))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/724  + (one of the four types of isolates; for oth … one of the four types of isolates; for others see: ldog paComment: "Illustration-isolates" are conceptually isolated illustrations, that is to say, illustrations simpliciter; it is a technical term often used to refer to mere illustrations, isolated from the definition and definiendum which they illustrate.ion and definiendum which they illustrate.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1686  + (one of the three types of prime cognizer f … one of the three types of prime cognizer for which ascertainment is induced by another; for others see: gzhan las nges kyi tshad ma; an illustration is: a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue which induces a doubting consciousness that thinks: 'Did I see blue or not?' (kho bos sngon po mthong ngam ma mthong snyam pa'i the tshom 'dren par byed pa'i sngon 'dzin dbang mngon)ren par byed pa'i sngon 'dzin dbang mngon))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1898  + (one of the two kinds of non-conceptual mistaken consciousness (rtog med log shes); the other is: non-conceptual mistaken consciousness that is a sense consciousness (dbang shes su gyur pa'i rtog med log shes))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1817  + (one of the two types of empowering conditions (bdag rkyen); the other is uncommon empowering condition (thun mongs ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1820  + (one of the two types of empowering conditions (bdag rkyen); the other is common empowering condition 9thun mongs ba'i bdag rkyen))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1818  + (one of the two types of empowering conditions (bdag rkyen); the other is common empowering condition (thun mong ba'i bdag rkyen))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1819  + (one of the two types of empowering conditions (bdag rkyen); the other is uncommon empowering condition (thun mongs ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1428  + (one of the two types of imputations accord … one of the two types of imputations according to BJ; the other is imputations of which the character is thoroughly cut off (mtshan nyid yongs su chad pa'i kun brtags); there are two kinds of rnam grangs pa'i kun brtags: (1) posited by names and terminology; (2) not posited by names and terminology; (2) not posited by names and terminology)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1908  + (one of the two types of permanent phenomenon; the other is permanent phenomenon whose occurrence is not possible (yin pa mi srid pa'i rtag pa) an illustration is: object of knowledge (shes bya))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1909  + (permanent phenomenon whose occurence is no … permanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible; Comment: There are two types of permanent phenomenon: permanent phenomenon whose occurence is possible (yin pa srid pa'i rtag pa), an illustration of which is the two, permanent and [functioning] thing (rtag dngos gnyis); and permanent phenomenon whose occurence is not possible, an illustration of which is not possible, an illustration of which is)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/170  + (predispositions of the view of self; Comme … predispositions of the view of self; Comment: There are four types of predispositions in Ge-luk-b#a explanations of Mind-Only (sems tsam): predispositions of [perceptions of] similar type (rigs mthun gyi bag chags); predispositions of verbalization (mngon brjod kyi bag chags, abhilApavAsanA); predispositions of the view of self (bdag lta'i bag chags, AtmadRStivAsanA); predispositions of the branches of cyclic existence (srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1104  + (pride beyond pride; Comment: This is one o … pride beyond pride; Comment: This is one of seven prides which NAgArjuna mentions in his Precious Garland, stanzas 407-412: pride of selfhood (bdag nyid nga rgyal), exceeding pride (lhag pa'i nga rgyal), pride beyond pride (nga rgyal las kyang nga rgyal), pride of thinking I (nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal), pride of conceit (mngon pa'i nga rgyal), erroneous pride (log pa'i nga rgyal), pride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).ride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/479  + (pride of inferiority; Comment: This is one … pride of inferiority; Comment: This is one of seven prides which NAgArjuna mentions in his Precious Garland, stanzas 407-412: pride of selfhood (bdag nyid nga rgyal), exceeding pride (lhag pa'i nga rgyal), pride beyond pride (nga rgyal las kyang nga rgyal), pride of thinking I (nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal), pride of conceit (mngon pa'i nga rgyal), erroneous pride (log pa'i nga rgyal), pride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).ride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/173  + (pride of selfhood; Comment: This is one of … pride of selfhood; Comment: This is one of seven prides which NAgArjuna mentions in his Precious Garland, stanzas 407-412: pride of selfhood (bdag nyid nga rgyal), exceeding pride (lhag pa'i nga rgyal), pride beyond pride (nga rgyal las kyang nga rgyal), pride of thinking I (nga'o snyam pa'i nga rgyal), pride of conceit (mngon pa'i nga rgyal), erroneous pride (log pa'i nga rgyal), pride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).ride of inferiority (dman pa'i nga rgyal).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/952  + (the two divisions of negative (dgag pa, pratiSedha))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/655  + (there are two kinds: one is the obstructions of body (lus sgrib), and the other is obstructions of speech (ngag sgrib))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1931  + (this is always a non-existent; compare: yul can gyi dgag bya)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1871  + (true establishment is one of the five objects of negation in the SvAtrantika system, and one of the eight in the PrAsaGgika system; for others see: [[dgag bya]])
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1705  + (Check. Entry originally had: shin rje'i bdag nyid (T))
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/822  + (Comment: A subject marker in logical texts … Comment: A subject marker in logical texts. The first example given above is the definition of ldog chos phung sum tsam po ba (isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type), illustrations of which are dgag pa (negative phenomenon), dngos po'i spyi (generality-of-functioning-thing), etc.yi (generality-of-functioning-thing), etc.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1653  + (Comment: A-ku L#o-drö-gya-tso (Precious La … Comment: A-ku L#o-drö-gya-tso (Precious Lamp, 223.2) takes this as referring to attaining forbearance, that is, facility, with respect to the meaning of the selflessness of phenomena. Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso (Port of Entry, 505.6) adds that through ascertaining the meaning of the non-production of phenomena upon taking the eight non-productions as reasons, one attains forbearance with respect to the doctrine of non-production, that is, selflessness. of non-production, that is, selflessness.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1031  + (Comment: An illustration is a sense direct … Comment: An illustration is a sense direct perception apprehending the color of a mirage which directly generates a superimposition apprehending the mirage as water (smig rgyu la chur 'dzin pa'i sgro 'dogs dngos su skyed par byed pa'i smig rgyu'i kha dog'dzin pa'i dbang mngon).mig rgyu'i kha dog'dzin pa'i dbang mngon).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1244  + (Comment: An illustration is desire ('dod c … Comment: An illustration is desire ('dod chags). There are six types of causes: fruitional cause (rnam smin gyi rgyu), co-arisen cause (lhan cig byung ba'i rgyu), creative cause (byed rgyu), cause of similar lot (skal mnyam gyi rgyu), omnipresent cause (kun 'gro'i rgyu), and associational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).ociational cause (mtshungs ldan gyi rgyu).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1286  + (Comment: An illustration of this is [functioning] thing that is an isolate phenomenon (ldog chos su gyur pa'i dngos po).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/467  + (Comment: Arhan/ arhant (dgra bcom pa) is t … Comment: Arhan/ arhant (dgra bcom pa) is translated as "Foe Destroyer" to accord with the usual Tibetan translation of the term and to assist in capturing the flavor of oral and written traditions that frequently refer to this etymology. Arhats have overcome the foe which is the afflictive emotions (nyon mongs, kleza), the chief of which is ignorance, the conception (according to the Consequence School) that persons and phenomena are established by way of their own character.\n The Indian and Tibetan translators were also aware of the etymology of arhant as "worthy one," as they translated the name of the "founder" of the Jaina system, Arhat, as mchod 'od "Worthy of Worship" (see Jam-y#ang-shay-b#a's Great Exposition of Tenets, ka, 62a.3). Also, they were aware of ChandrakIrti's gloss of the term as "Worthy One" in his Clear Words: "Because of being worthy of worship by the world of gods, humans, and demi-gods, they are called Arhats" (sadevamAnuøAsurAl lokAt pUnArhatvAd arhannityuchyate [Poussin, 486.5], lha dang mi dang lha ma yin du bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis mchod par 'os pas dgra bcom pa zhes brjod la [P5260, vol. 98 75.2.2]). Also, they were aware of Haribhadra's twofold etymology in his Illumination of the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom SUtra. In the context of the list of epithets qualifying the retinue of Buddha at the beginning of the sUtra (see Unrai Wogihara, ed., AbhisamayAla™kArAlokA PrajJA-pAramitA-vyAkhyA, The Work of Haribhadra [Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932-5; reprint ed., Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1973], 8.18), Haribhadra says, "They are called arhant [=Worthy One, from root arh 'to be worthy'] since they are worthy of worship, religious donations, and being assembled together in a group, etc." (W9.8-9: sarva evAtra pUjA-dakøi˜A-ga˜a-parikarøAdy-Arhatayar-han-taH; P5189, 67.5.7: 'dir thams cad kyang mchod pa dang // yon dang tshogs su 'dub la sogs par 'os pas na dgra bcom pa'o).\nAlso, "They are called arhant [= Foe Destroyer, arihan] because they have destroyed (hata) the foe (ari)."\n(W10.18: hatAritvAd arhantaH; P5189, 69.3.6. dgra rnams bcom pas na dgra bcom pa'o). Thus, this is a considered preference in the face of alternative etymologies—"Foe Destroyer" requiring a not unusual i infix to make ari-han, ari meaning enemy and han meaning to kill, and thus "Foe Destroyer." Unfortunately, one word in English cannot convey both this meaning and "Worthy of Worship"; thus, I have gone with what clearly has become the predominant meaning in Tibet. (For an excellent discussion of the two etymologies of "Arhat" in Buddhism and Jainism, see L.M. Joshi's "Facets of Jaina Religiousness in Comparative Light," L.D. Series 85, [Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, May 1981], 53-58). Institute of Indology, May 1981], 53-58).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1444  + (Comment: Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso takes thi … Comment: Jik-may-dam-chö-gya-tso takes this term to mean "object of observation that is purified [that is, devoid] of contamination" (zag bcas kyis rnam par dag pa'i lam gyi dmigs pa). However, other scholars more cogently take the term as referring to an object that is such that meditation upon it purifies obstructions. For instance, Jam-y#ang-shay-b#a, in speaking about the ultimate that is explicitly indicated at this point, qualifies the term "object of observation of purification" (rnam dag gi dmigs pa) with the phrase, "that which is such that, when it is observed and then is meditated upon, the obstructions to omniscience become purified" (gang la dmigs nas bsgom na shes sgrib dag par 'gyur ba).nas bsgom na shes sgrib dag par 'gyur ba).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/614  + (Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymolo … Comment: Ken-sur Nga-w#ang-lek-den etymologized this is "full-fall", i.e., one who is filled with the afflictions and has fallen into cyclic existence. As he said, this is not true of all persons, because even a Buddha, for instance, is a person. It is to be noted that animals, for instance, are persons. It is said that in general "self" (bdag, Atman) "person," and "I" (nga, ahaM) are equivalent, but in the particular context of the selflessness of persons "self" and "person" are not at all equivalent and do not at all have the same meaning. In the term "selflessness of persons," "self" refers to a falsely imagined status that needs to be refuted, whereas "persons" refers to existent beings who are the bases with respect to which that refutation is made. All four Buddhist schools, therefore, hold that persons exist; they do not claim that persons are mere fictions of ignorance. The schools hold differing opinions on the nature of the person. According to Ge-luk-b#a scholars, all except the Middle Way Consequence School posit something from within the bases of imputation of a person — usually either mind or the collection of mind and body — as being the person. In contrast, the Consequence School holds that, even though a person is imputed in dependence upon mind and body (in the Formless Realm, a person is imputed in dependence only on mind), the person is neither mind nor body nor a collection of mind and body, since it is just the I that is imputed in dependence upon mind and body. Following the lead of ChandrakIrti, recognized by most as the founder of the Consequence School, Ge-luk-b#a scholars identify how in the other schools some factor among the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses) or the collection of them is considered to be the person when sought analytically from among its bases of imputation: the Proponents of the Great Exposition, in general, hold that the mere collection of the mental and physical aggregates is the person; however, some of the five SaMmitIya subschools of the Great Exposition School maintain that all five aggregates are the person (although the absurdity of one person being five persons would seem difficult not to notice) while another subschool, the Avantaka, asserts that the mind alone is the person; the SUtra School Following Scripture assert that the continuum of the aggregates is the person; the SUtra School Following Reasoning maintains that the mental consciousness is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Scripture holds that the mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, AlayavijJAna) is the person; the Mind-Only School Following Reasoning asserts that the mental consciousness is the person; both the Yogic Autonomy School and the SUtra Autonomy School assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is the person. For the most part, the delineation of what these schools assert to be the person is a matter of conjecture and not reporting of forthright statements in these schools' own texts. Though it is clear that most of these schools (if not all) accept that persons exist, it is often not clear in their own literature that they assert that something from within the bases of imputation of a person is the person. Rather, as presented in Vasubandhu's commentary on the ninth chapter of his Treasury of Manifest Knowledge, persons are merely asserted to be "non-associated compositional factors" (ldan min 'du byed, viprayuktasaMskAra) and thus an instance of the fourth aggregate, compositional factors, without a specific identification — of any of the five aggregates that are a person's bases of imputation — as the person.son's bases of imputation — as the person.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/444  + (Comment: Negative phenomenon (dgag pa) is equivalent to gzhan sel (exlusion of the other, other-exclusion [anyApoha]). Examples are rtag pa ma yin pa (non-permanent); bum pa ma yin pa las log pa (opposite from non-pot).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/604  + (Comment: Nga-w#ang-lek-den (ngag dbang legs ldan) suggested that ga le may have derived from gang legs (whatever is good).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1331  + (Comment: One of the five kinds of effects ('bras bu). With respect to the divisions, the first would, for instance, be to kill and to be killed; the second would, for instance, be to kill and then to kill again.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/777  + (Comment: One of the four foods, which acco … Comment: One of the four foods, which according to (1) morsel food (kham gyi zas, kavaDaMkAra-AhAra), (2) contact food (reg pa'i zas, sparza-AhAra) which is contaminated touch that increases the great elements associated with the sense powers, (3) intention food (sems pa'i zas, manaHsaMcetanAhAra) which is intention (or attention) that involves hope for a desired object, and (4) consciousness food (rnam shes kyi zas, vijJAna-AhAra) which is the collections of consciousness. S#er-s#hül L#o-sang-pün-tsok (Notes, 13b.5) cites the third chapter of Vasubandhu's Treasury of Manifest Knowledge (III.119-128) which indicates that:\n* coarse food furthers the body that is the support of this lifetime\n* contact furthers the mind that depends on the support of the body\n* intention projects future lifetimes (in that it is the main feature of karma)\n* the karmas that actualize future lifetimes in the sense of filling in the details of the lifetime projected by intention are posited as consciousness.\nS#er-s#hül quotes Vasubandhu's explanation that morsel food exists only in the Desire Realm whereas the other three exist in all three realms—Desire, Form, and Formless—and are necessarily contaminated. As Ge-s#hay B#el-den-drak-b#a explained, the foods increase cyclic existence, and thus uncontaminated contact, intention, and consciousness are not posited as food. S#er-s#hül paraphrases AsaGga's Compendium of Ascertainments which explains that although meditative absorptions and engaging in pure behavior are means of furthering the body through eliminating unfavorable circumstances, they are not posited as foods since they do not further the body by way of their own entities. His point must be that meditative stabilization therefore should not be included in the list.\n Contrary to this, Geshe Gedün Lodrö of the University of Hamburg includes meditative stabilization (ting nge 'dzin) and gives mental food as the second (Calm Abiding and Special Insight, 70-71):\n"The four types of nourishment are (1) coarse food, (2) mental nourishment, (3) nourishment of intention, and (4) nourishment of consciousness. The sense of mental satisfaction that comes when a desire is fulfilled is called mental nourishment. Just as coarse food nourishes the body, so satisfaction nourishes or replenishes the mind upon fulfillment of a desire. The third type, nourishment of intention, is an action that projects the next lifetime. Since it generates or produces the next lifetime, it is called a nourisher, or nourishment; it is the second link of the twelve-linked dependent-arising. Similarly, the third link, which is called consciousness, is known as the food of consciousness. Just as the action that projects, or impels, a future lifetime is called a nourisher, so the consciousness which is imprinted with that action and which will at the time of the effect of that action in the future life be imprinted with other karmas is called a nourisher, or nourishment. Why is [the first link of dependent-arising,] ignorance, not called a nourisher? It is because ignorance is the agent that pervades everything; thus, it is not singled out as a nourisher. There is still another type of nourishment, that of meditative stabilization. Persons who have achieved calm abiding and special insight and have proceeded to high levels of the path do not need to use coarse food; they have the nourishment of meditative stabilization.e nourishment of meditative stabilization.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/52  + (Comment: One of the four types of normative Check Kathy pervasion (khyab pa rnal ma bzhi); an illustration of this type of reasoning is: Whatever is a definiendum is necessarily not permanent (mtshon bya yin na / rtag pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathy)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/53  + (Comment: One of the four types of perverse … Comment: One of the four types of perverse pervasions (khyab pa phyin ci log bzhi); an illustration of this type of reasoning is: whatever is a definiendum is necessarily not not-permanent (mtshon bya yin na / rtag pa ma yin pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathyma yin pa ma yin pas khyab pa).Check Kathy)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1641  + (Comment: One of the six kinds of causes; for others see rgyu.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/854  + (Comment: One of the six kinds of causes; for others see rgyu.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/443  + (Comment: See dgag pa.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/613  + (Comment: See gang rung.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/449  + (Comment: The first of the three also is taken as 'khrul pa dgag pa (refuting mistake/error).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1360  + (Comment: There are four types of predispos … Comment: There are four types of predispositions in Ge-luk-b#a explanations of Mind-Only (sems tsam): predispositions of [perceptions of] similar type (rigs mthun gyi bag chags); predispositions of verbalization (mngon brjod kyi bag chags, abhilApavAsanA); predispositions of the view of self (bdag lta'i bag chags, AtmadRStivAsanA); predispositions of the branches of cyclic existence (srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.pa'i yan lag gi bag chags, bhavAGgavAsanA.)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/51  + (Comment: This is an illustration of non-conceptual counterfeit direct preception which is a sense consciousness and whose cause of error exists in the object (dbang shes su gyur pa'i 'khrul rgyu yul la yod pa'i rtog med mngon sum ltar snang).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1560  + (Comment: This is an illustration of a mistaken conceptual consciousness ('khrul ba'i rtog pa).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1565  + (Comment: This is an illustration of a conceptual subequent cognition induced by an inference (rjes dpag gis drangs pa'i rtog pa bcad shes).)
  • Steinert App Dictionaries/06-Hopkins-Comment/1558  + (Comment: This is an illustration of equal doubt (cha mnyam [snyoms] pa'i the tshom).)
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