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རྣམ་ཤེས་

rnam shes

Hopkins Comments ?

No direct match.

147 other match(es)

Reference Notes from other Works [i.e. Footnotes/Endnotes]

Book	Author/Translator	Note
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	452 The twelve links of dependent origination (dvādashāṅga pratītyasamutpāda, rten 'brel bcu gnyis) are (1) ignorance (avidyā, ma rig pa); (2) karmic formative forces (saṃskarakarma, 'du byed kyi las); (3) consciousnesses (vijñāna, rnam shes); (4) names and forms (nāmarūpa, ming gzugs); (5) six sense spheres (āyatana, skye mched); (6) contact (sparsha, reg pa); (7) feelings (vedanā, tshor ba); (8) craving (tṛiṣhṇā, sred pa); (9) grasping (upādāna, len pa); (10) existence (bhava, srid pa); (11) birth (jāti, skye ba); and (12) aging and death (jarāmaraṇa, rga shi).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	519 The term chittamātra (sems tsam; mind only) appears in texts such as the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra and Sūtra Unraveling the Intention, but it does not seem to have been used in Indian Buddhist texts to denote a system of thought. In Tibet, however, it became a common term for the philosophical tenet system of those known in India as Yogāchāras (rNal 'byor spyod pa, Yoga Practitioners) and Proponents of Consciousness (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba). For an overview of the use of the term in Indian Buddhism, see Lindtner 1997.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	300 The five aggregates (skandhas, phung po lnga) are forms, feelings, discriminations, formative forces, and consciousnesses. The eighteen constituents (dhātus, khams bco brgyad) are the six objects of perception (visual forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena), the six sense faculties, and six consciousnesses. The twelve sense spheres (āyatanas, skye mched bcu gnyis) are the six objects of the sense consciousnesses and the six sense faculties. The four modes of birth (skye gnas bzhi) are birth from a womb, birth from an egg, birth from heat and moisture, and spontaneous birth. The five kinds of beings ( 'gro ba lnga) are hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods (demigods are included with gods). GTCD: Among the four kinds of food (zas bzhi), coarse food (or "morsels") is for the growth of the sense faculties of this body; food of contact nourishes the consciousnesses; mental food is what propels one towards future existences; and food of consciousness is what finalizes the next existence (zas bzhi/ kham gyi zas dang/ reg pa'i zas dang/ sems pa'i zas dang/ rnam shes kyi zas te bzhi ste/ tshe 'di la gnas dbang po rgyas pa'i don du kham zas dang/ brten pa rnam shes rgyas pa'i don du reg pa'i zas te gnyis dang/ phyi mar srid pa gzhan 'phen pa'i don du sems pa'i zas dang/ srid pa gzhan 'grub pa'i don du rnam shes kyi zas dang gnyis te bsdoms na bzhi'o). (Note that TOK, II:468.17 has khams, but according to the GTCD it should be kham.) Ngawang Palden's (Ngag dbang dpal ldan) Annotations (Hopkins 2003, 224) says, "It is explained that morsels [that is, usual sorts of food] are only in the desire realm; the other three foods exist in all three realms—desire, form, and formless."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	600 These two lines appear in Jetāri's Differentiating the Sugata's Texts as verse 6ab (Dg. T. Beijing 63:885), with the simple difference that the second line reads shes pa dam pa'i don du yod (instead of rnam shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	526 Appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna, len pa'i rnam shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	198 The four spheres of the formless realms (gzugs med skye mched mu bzhi): (1) the sphere of Limitless Space (nam mkha' mtha' yas skye mched); (2) the sphere of Limitless Consciousness (rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched); (3) the sphere of Nothingness (ci yang med pa'i mtha' yas skye mched); and (4) the sphere of Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination ( 'du shes med min gyi skye mched).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	599 Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa, by Āryadeva, verse 26ab. Toh. 3851, f. 27b2; Dg.T. Beijing 57:853. Dg.T. Beijing reads gzung dang 'dzin pa las grol ba'i/ rnam shes dam pa'i don du yod. TOK, II:509.20–21 has gzung dang 'dzin pa rnam grol ba'i/ rnam par shes pa don dam yod. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	522 Yogāchāras (rNal 'byor spyod pa, Yoga Practitioners). Early uses of this term designated Buddhist practitioners in general, but it later came to be associated with the works attributed to Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, possibly having been derived from the title of Asaṅga's Yogāchārabhūmi (rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa, Bhūmis of Yogic Practice). The first, or at least an early, use of "Yogāchāra" as referring to a school of thought is found in Bhāvaviveka's Lamp of Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa, Shes rab sgron ma), and his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahṛidayakārikā, dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa) and its auto-commentary, Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā, rTog ge 'bar ba). This became the most common term in India for followers of the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, followed by "Proponents of Consciousness" (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba). See Hanson 1998, 3–11; and Davidson 1985, 51.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	601 Jetāri's Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (verse 8ab) reads rnam shes don dam yin pa ru/ de yang mkhas rnams mi bzhed de (Dg.T. Beijing 63:885). Note the slight difference with TOK, II:509.22: rnam shes de yang don dam du/ yod par mkhas rnams mi bzhed de. Āryadeva makes a similar statement in his Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom, verse 29ab: rnam shes dam pa'i don ldan pa/ de yang brten rnams mi 'dod de. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	578 This statement is almost identical to one Jamyang Shepa makes in his Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo) (579.2–3), which suggests that there is a common source for this statement (which I have not been able to locate): dri bcas ni rnam shes di rnams sim gdung sogs kyi 'dzin rnam du don dam par gnas kyang/ ma rig pa'i mthus phyi rol gyi gzung ba'i rnam par snang bas rnam shes rang gi ngo bo rdzun pa'am 'khrul pa des gos par smra bas dri bcas su 'dod de, "Some say that although consciousnesses are, ultimately, the perceiving aspect of pleasure, pain, and so forth, the force of ignorance causes them to appear as outer perceived images, and thus the entity of consciousness is tainted by falsity or confusion. Therefore, they are called Proponents of Staining False Images." See also Hopkins 2003, 425.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	520 Proponents of Cognition (Vijñaptivādin or Vijñaptika, rNam rig smra ba). The use of this term to denote a school of thought probably evolved from the expression "cognition only" (vijñaptimātra, rnam rig tsam), which is found, for example, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Intention (Chapter 8); see Powers 1995, 155. Although it seems that "Proponents of Cognition" is used interchangeably with Proponents of Consciousness (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba), the latter is more common in Indian Buddhist texts. For example, the Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary (Negi 2001; vol. 7, pp. 3165 and 3175) lists four instances of Vijñānavādin (rNam par shes par smra ba) but only one for the form Vijñaptimātravādin (rNam par rig pa tsam du smra ba, Proponents of Mere Cognition), and none for Vijñaptivādin; and Vijñānavādin is found in the MVP, whereas Vijñaptivādin or Vijñaptimātravādin are not. I am grateful to Karl Brunnhölzl for help with this information. For more references relating to this term, see below n. 533. For Shākya Chokden's statement that it is wrong to regard Proponents of Cognition and Chittamātras as the same, see Chapter 11, p. 266.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	343 rNam shes kyi tshogs.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	804 For the sake of comparison, the following is a list of Tsongkhapa's enumeration of the eight uncommon theses in his Illumination of the Thought (ACIP S5408@124B): (1-2) [The Prāsaṅgika system] has an uncommon way of refuting an ālaya consciousness that is separate in essence from the six modes of consciousness and reflexive awareness (tshogs drug las ngo bo tha dad pa'i kun gzhi rnam shes dang rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong ma yin pa). (3) It does not accept the use of independently [verifiable] probative arguments to generate [an understanding of] the view of suchness in the mindstream of opponents (rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho na nyid kyi lta ba skyed pa khas mi len pa). (4) It is necessary to accept external objects in the same way that cognition is accepted (shes pa khas len pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa). (5) Shrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize that entities have no nature (nyan rang la dngos po rang bzhin med par rtogs pa yod pa). (6) Clinging to a self-entity of phenomena is posited as an affliction (chos kyi bdag 'dzin nyon mongs su 'jog pa). (7) Disintegration is a [functioning] thing (zhig pa dngos po yin pa). (8) Therefore, [this system] has an uncommon way of positing the three times (de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum gyi 'jog tshul thun mong ma yin pa).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	548 The analogy of an illusion (māyā, sgyu ma) is widely used in Buddhist texts; one frequently quoted source is Vasubandhu's Exposition of the Three Natures, verses 27–30. Jamgön Kongtrul is clearly drawing from these verses: Through the power of [the magician's] mantra, a magical creation, appears like an elephant, [but] only an image appears— there is no elephant that exists. (27) The imagined nature is like the elephant. The dependent is like that image. The nonexistence of the elephant there is the consummate [nature]. (28) From the fundamental mind, imagination of what is unreal appears as a duality. Since duality does not exist at all, there simply exists an image. (29) The fundamental consciousness is like the mantra. Thusness is like the wood. Conception is like the image of the elephant. Duality is like the elephant. (30) sngags mthus sgyu ma byas pa yis/ ji nas glang po snang gyur pa/ rnam pa tsam zhig snang bar 'dod/ glang po kun du yod ma yin/ brtags pa'i rang bzhin glang po 'dra/ gzhan dbang de'i rnam lta bu'o/ de la glang po dngos med gang/ de 'dra yongs su grub par 'dod/ rtsa ba'i sems las gnyis bdag tu/ yang dag ma yin kun rtog snang/ gnyis po shin tu med pas na/ de ni rnam pa tsam du yod/ rtsa ba'i rnam shes sngags dang 'dra/ de bzhin nyid ni shing 'dra 'dod/ rnam rtog glang po'i rnam pa 'dra/ gnyis ni ngag po lta bu'o. Dg.T. Beijing 77:31–2. (Vasubandhu did not write an auto-commentary and no one else wrote a commentary.) Note that "fundamental mind" (rtsa ba'i sems) is the ālaya consciousness. Nagao (1991, 71-72) observes, "It should be clear from the magic show simile that the difference between the other-dependent nature and the imagined nature is very subtle and delicate; the former is compared to an elephant form and the latter to an attachment to that form. The difference is established on the basis of whether 'attachment' is operative or not. The difference between the other-dependent and consummated natures is likewise subtle. When the other-dependent nature ceases to be the cause for the delusory imagination to appear, it is identified with the consummated nature, the difference being whether such a cause is operative or not. The three natures, then, are neither different from each other nor identical to each other; or, rather, they are both different and identical at one and the same time." See Nagao 1991, 69–72; Boquist 1993, 126–8; Garfield 2002, 128–51; and Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 226–7. This example is also used in the Ornament of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Chapter 12, verse 15; see Jamspal et al. 2004, 122.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	452 The twelve links of dependent origination (dvādashāṅga pratītyasamutpāda, rten 'brel bcu gnyis) are (1) ignorance (avidyā, ma rig pa); (2) karmic formative forces (saṃskarakarma, 'du byed kyi las); (3) consciousnesses (vijñāna, rnam shes); (4) names and forms (nāmarūpa, ming gzugs); (5) six sense spheres (āyatana, skye mched); (6) contact (sparsha, reg pa); (7) feelings (vedanā, tshor ba); (8) craving (tṛiṣhṇā, sred pa); (9) grasping (upādāna, len pa); (10) existence (bhava, srid pa); (11) birth (jāti, skye ba); and (12) aging and death (jarāmaraṇa, rga shi).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	519 The term chittamātra (sems tsam; mind only) appears in texts such as the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra and Sūtra Unraveling the Intention, but it does not seem to have been used in Indian Buddhist texts to denote a system of thought. In Tibet, however, it became a common term for the philosophical tenet system of those known in India as Yogāchāras (rNal 'byor spyod pa, Yoga Practitioners) and Proponents of Consciousness (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba). For an overview of the use of the term in Indian Buddhism, see Lindtner 1997.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	300 The five aggregates (skandhas, phung po lnga) are forms, feelings, discriminations, formative forces, and consciousnesses. The eighteen constituents (dhātus, khams bco brgyad) are the six objects of perception (visual forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena), the six sense faculties, and six consciousnesses. The twelve sense spheres (āyatanas, skye mched bcu gnyis) are the six objects of the sense consciousnesses and the six sense faculties. The four modes of birth (skye gnas bzhi) are birth from a womb, birth from an egg, birth from heat and moisture, and spontaneous birth. The five kinds of beings ( 'gro ba lnga) are hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods (demigods are included with gods). GTCD: Among the four kinds of food (zas bzhi), coarse food (or "morsels") is for the growth of the sense faculties of this body; food of contact nourishes the consciousnesses; mental food is what propels one towards future existences; and food of consciousness is what finalizes the next existence (zas bzhi/ kham gyi zas dang/ reg pa'i zas dang/ sems pa'i zas dang/ rnam shes kyi zas te bzhi ste/ tshe 'di la gnas dbang po rgyas pa'i don du kham zas dang/ brten pa rnam shes rgyas pa'i don du reg pa'i zas te gnyis dang/ phyi mar srid pa gzhan 'phen pa'i don du sems pa'i zas dang/ srid pa gzhan 'grub pa'i don du rnam shes kyi zas dang gnyis te bsdoms na bzhi'o). (Note that TOK, II:468.17 has khams, but according to the GTCD it should be kham.) Ngawang Palden's (Ngag dbang dpal ldan) Annotations (Hopkins 2003, 224) says, "It is explained that morsels [that is, usual sorts of food] are only in the desire realm; the other three foods exist in all three realms—desire, form, and formless."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	600 These two lines appear in Jetāri's Differentiating the Sugata's Texts as verse 6ab (Dg. T. Beijing 63:885), with the simple difference that the second line reads shes pa dam pa'i don du yod (instead of rnam shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	526 Appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna, len pa'i rnam shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	198 The four spheres of the formless realms (gzugs med skye mched mu bzhi): (1) the sphere of Limitless Space (nam mkha' mtha' yas skye mched); (2) the sphere of Limitless Consciousness (rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched); (3) the sphere of Nothingness (ci yang med pa'i mtha' yas skye mched); and (4) the sphere of Neither Discrimination nor Nondiscrimination ( 'du shes med min gyi skye mched).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	599 Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa, by Āryadeva, verse 26ab. Toh. 3851, f. 27b2; Dg.T. Beijing 57:853. Dg.T. Beijing reads gzung dang 'dzin pa las grol ba'i/ rnam shes dam pa'i don du yod. TOK, II:509.20–21 has gzung dang 'dzin pa rnam grol ba'i/ rnam par shes pa don dam yod. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	522 Yogāchāras (rNal 'byor spyod pa, Yoga Practitioners). Early uses of this term designated Buddhist practitioners in general, but it later came to be associated with the works attributed to Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, possibly having been derived from the title of Asaṅga's Yogāchārabhūmi (rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa, Bhūmis of Yogic Practice). The first, or at least an early, use of "Yogāchāra" as referring to a school of thought is found in Bhāvaviveka's Lamp of Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa, Shes rab sgron ma), and his Heart of the Middle Way (Madhyamakahṛidayakārikā, dBu ma'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa) and its auto-commentary, Blaze of Reasoning (Tarkajvālā, rTog ge 'bar ba). This became the most common term in India for followers of the thought of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, followed by "Proponents of Consciousness" (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba). See Hanson 1998, 3–11; and Davidson 1985, 51.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	601 Jetāri's Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (verse 8ab) reads rnam shes don dam yin pa ru/ de yang mkhas rnams mi bzhed de (Dg.T. Beijing 63:885). Note the slight difference with TOK, II:509.22: rnam shes de yang don dam du/ yod par mkhas rnams mi bzhed de. Āryadeva makes a similar statement in his Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom, verse 29ab: rnam shes dam pa'i don ldan pa/ de yang brten rnams mi 'dod de. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	578 This statement is almost identical to one Jamyang Shepa makes in his Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo) (579.2–3), which suggests that there is a common source for this statement (which I have not been able to locate): dri bcas ni rnam shes di rnams sim gdung sogs kyi 'dzin rnam du don dam par gnas kyang/ ma rig pa'i mthus phyi rol gyi gzung ba'i rnam par snang bas rnam shes rang gi ngo bo rdzun pa'am 'khrul pa des gos par smra bas dri bcas su 'dod de, "Some say that although consciousnesses are, ultimately, the perceiving aspect of pleasure, pain, and so forth, the force of ignorance causes them to appear as outer perceived images, and thus the entity of consciousness is tainted by falsity or confusion. Therefore, they are called Proponents of Staining False Images." See also Hopkins 2003, 425.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	520 Proponents of Cognition (Vijñaptivādin or Vijñaptika, rNam rig smra ba). The use of this term to denote a school of thought probably evolved from the expression "cognition only" (vijñaptimātra, rnam rig tsam), which is found, for example, in the Sūtra Unraveling the Intention (Chapter 8); see Powers 1995, 155. Although it seems that "Proponents of Cognition" is used interchangeably with Proponents of Consciousness (Vijñānavādin, rNam shes smra ba), the latter is more common in Indian Buddhist texts. For example, the Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary (Negi 2001; vol. 7, pp. 3165 and 3175) lists four instances of Vijñānavādin (rNam par shes par smra ba) but only one for the form Vijñaptimātravādin (rNam par rig pa tsam du smra ba, Proponents of Mere Cognition), and none for Vijñaptivādin; and Vijñānavādin is found in the MVP, whereas Vijñaptivādin or Vijñaptimātravādin are not. I am grateful to Karl Brunnhölzl for help with this information. For more references relating to this term, see below n. 533. For Shākya Chokden's statement that it is wrong to regard Proponents of Cognition and Chittamātras as the same, see Chapter 11, p. 266.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	343 rNam shes kyi tshogs.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	804 For the sake of comparison, the following is a list of Tsongkhapa's enumeration of the eight uncommon theses in his Illumination of the Thought (ACIP S5408@124B): (1-2) [The Prāsaṅgika system] has an uncommon way of refuting an ālaya consciousness that is separate in essence from the six modes of consciousness and reflexive awareness (tshogs drug las ngo bo tha dad pa'i kun gzhi rnam shes dang rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong ma yin pa). (3) It does not accept the use of independently [verifiable] probative arguments to generate [an understanding of] the view of suchness in the mindstream of opponents (rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho na nyid kyi lta ba skyed pa khas mi len pa). (4) It is necessary to accept external objects in the same way that cognition is accepted (shes pa khas len pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa). (5) Shrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize that entities have no nature (nyan rang la dngos po rang bzhin med par rtogs pa yod pa). (6) Clinging to a self-entity of phenomena is posited as an affliction (chos kyi bdag 'dzin nyon mongs su 'jog pa). (7) Disintegration is a [functioning] thing (zhig pa dngos po yin pa). (8) Therefore, [this system] has an uncommon way of positing the three times (de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum gyi 'jog tshul thun mong ma yin pa).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	548 The analogy of an illusion (māyā, sgyu ma) is widely used in Buddhist texts; one frequently quoted source is Vasubandhu's Exposition of the Three Natures, verses 27–30. Jamgön Kongtrul is clearly drawing from these verses: Through the power of [the magician's] mantra, a magical creation, appears like an elephant, [but] only an image appears— there is no elephant that exists. (27) The imagined nature is like the elephant. The dependent is like that image. The nonexistence of the elephant there is the consummate [nature]. (28) From the fundamental mind, imagination of what is unreal appears as a duality. Since duality does not exist at all, there simply exists an image. (29) The fundamental consciousness is like the mantra. Thusness is like the wood. Conception is like the image of the elephant. Duality is like the elephant. (30) sngags mthus sgyu ma byas pa yis/ ji nas glang po snang gyur pa/ rnam pa tsam zhig snang bar 'dod/ glang po kun du yod ma yin/ brtags pa'i rang bzhin glang po 'dra/ gzhan dbang de'i rnam lta bu'o/ de la glang po dngos med gang/ de 'dra yongs su grub par 'dod/ rtsa ba'i sems las gnyis bdag tu/ yang dag ma yin kun rtog snang/ gnyis po shin tu med pas na/ de ni rnam pa tsam du yod/ rtsa ba'i rnam shes sngags dang 'dra/ de bzhin nyid ni shing 'dra 'dod/ rnam rtog glang po'i rnam pa 'dra/ gnyis ni ngag po lta bu'o. Dg.T. Beijing 77:31–2. (Vasubandhu did not write an auto-commentary and no one else wrote a commentary.) Note that "fundamental mind" (rtsa ba'i sems) is the ālaya consciousness. Nagao (1991, 71-72) observes, "It should be clear from the magic show simile that the difference between the other-dependent nature and the imagined nature is very subtle and delicate; the former is compared to an elephant form and the latter to an attachment to that form. The difference is established on the basis of whether 'attachment' is operative or not. The difference between the other-dependent and consummated natures is likewise subtle. When the other-dependent nature ceases to be the cause for the delusory imagination to appear, it is identified with the consummated nature, the difference being whether such a cause is operative or not. The three natures, then, are neither different from each other nor identical to each other; or, rather, they are both different and identical at one and the same time." See Nagao 1991, 69–72; Boquist 1993, 126–8; Garfield 2002, 128–51; and Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 226–7. This example is also used in the Ornament of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Chapter 12, verse 15; see Jamspal et al. 2004, 122.
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	35. Fundamental consciousness (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi rnam shes): a type of consciousness asserted mainly in the Idealist trend in Buddhist philosophy as the repository of predispositions and the source of the phenomenal world.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1177. In the Yogācāra system, the typical triad of "mind (citta/sems)," "mentation (manas/ yid)," and "consciousness (vijñāna/rnam shes)"refers to the ālaya-consciousness, the afflicted mind, and the remaining six consciousnesses.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2593. This refers to the typical Yogācāra triad of "mind (citta/sems)," "mentation (manas/ yid)," and "consciousness (vijñāna/rnam shes)" as indicating the ālaya-consciousness, the afflicted mind, and the remaining six consciousnesses. Shentongpas (such as Dölpopa, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé, and Mikyö Dorje in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra) often speak of the "ālaya-consciousness"versus the "ālaya" or "ālaya-wisdom"in the sense of the sugata heart. According to Khenchen Tsültrim Gyatso Rinpoche, from a shentong point of view, the problem with the position that Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism" (taking smallest moments of self-aware consciousness free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended to be ultimately existent) is that it fails to realize that, ultimately, the ālaya and self-awareness are nothing but the luminous nature of the mind. Naturally, any attempt to establish the ālaya and self-awareness as really existing phenomena on the level of seeming reality cannot withstand Madhyamaka reasoning. In Mere Mentalism, self-awareness is the inward-facing aspect in each moment of consciousness (be it a sense consciousness, a thought, or an emotion) that experiences itself without being differentiable into an experiencer and what is experienced. Once the illusion of external objects is seen through, it is this self-awareness that realizes the absence of any subject-object duality and is itself free from such duality. This is called "the ultimate dependent,"which is equivalent to the perfect nature when understood as the dependent nature's being empty of the imaginary nature. The self-awareness (in the sense of the personally experienced wisdom of the sugata heart) that is discussed in the Lamp and other shentong texts operates on the level of ultimate reality alone and is never connected with afflictions or any states of mind of seeming reality, but is empty of both the imaginary and the dependent natures. Just as all phenomena depend on space for their existence and interactions, while space neither depends on, nor is connected to, them, all seeming phenomena—the adventitious stains—operate within the infinite space of the inseparability of mind's expanse and awareness, but this nature of the mind neither depends on, nor has any connection with, these stains. This is explained at length in Uttaratantra I.52–63. Without exception, the afflictions and the resulting karma and suffering of ordinary beings arise from "improper mental engagement,"that is, their fourfold mistakenness of taking what is impermanent to be permanent, what is suffering to be happiness, what is impure to be pure, and what lacks a self or identity to have a self or identity. From the perspective of the Uttaratantra and RGVV, even the opposites of these four (as realized by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas) are not "proper mental engagement." For, such proper mental engagement consists of "the power of yoga"—the nondual and nonconceptual meditative equipoise of realizing the four pāramitās of supreme permanence, bliss, purity, and self, which are beyond any clinging to the above four mistakennesses and their opposites (for details on these four pāramitās, see section 2.2.1. in the text below). Since such yoga entails the freedom from the duality of apprehender and apprehended, it lacks the fundamental ignorance of "improper mental engagement,"which is also known as "false imagination."