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རང་རིག་

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Reference Notes from other Works [i.e. Footnotes/Endnotes]

Book	Author/Translator	Note
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	717 The four valid means of cognition (pramāṇa, tshad ma) were propounded by the Nyāyas (Logicians) and became widely accepted in Indian philosophical circles (see Dreyfus 1997, 293–4). Of these four, Buddhists, as followers of the epistemological treatises of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, only accept direct perception and inference as valid forms of cognition. Broadly speaking, Chandrakīrti and his followers were the exception and accepted the use of all four in debate with others. Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso (1996b/2000) says, "the general definition of valid cognition is 'a new and undeceiving awareness'" (gsar du mi bslu ba'i rig pa tha snyad tshad ma spyi'i mtshan nyid); and "the definition from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas is 'an awareness which clarifies what was not known [previously]'" (ma shes don gsal gyi rig pa log rtog bsal ba'i dbang du byas pa'i mtshan nyid). (In the following paragraphs, the definitions for direct perceptual valid cognition and inferential valid cognition are from Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso 1996b/2000.) (1) Direct perceptual valid cognition (pratyakṣhapramāṇa, mngon sum tshad ma) is defined as "a nonconceptual and nonmistaken awareness" (rtog pa dang bral zhing ma 'khrul pa'i rig pa). It is of four types: sense direct perception (indriya pratyakṣha, dbang po'i mngon sum), mental direct perception (mānasapratyakṣha, yid kyi mngon sum), reflexively aware direct perception (rang rig mngon sum), and yogic direct perception (yogi pratyakṣha, rnal 'byor mngon sum). For definitions of these subcategories, see the Classifications of Mind and Book Six, Part One (TOK, II:233–4). Generally, Tibetan commentators agree that on a conventional level Prāsaṅgikas accept sense, mental, and yogic direct perceptions, but they disagree about whether Prāsaṅgikas accept reflexively aware direct perception. Tsongkhapa, for example, states that Prāsaṅgikas do not accept reflexive awareness, not even conventionally (this is one of the "eight difficult points"; see p. 247 and n. 803 for related sources); whereas Mipham states that Prāsaṅgikas do accept reflexively aware direct perception conventionally (see Pettit 1999, 129 and 497n451). According to Āchārya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen (ALTG), Mikyö Dorjé often criticizes reflexive awareness, but he does not make a clear statement on whether the Prāsaṅgikas accept it conventionally or reject it completely. It is generally understood that Mikyö Dorjé's refutations of reflexive awareness are only refutations on the level of slight analysis. (2) Inferential valid cognition (anumāṇapramāṇa, rjes dpag tshad ma) is of two types: inference for oneself (rang don rjes dpag) and inference for others (gzhan don rjes dpag). Inference for oneself is defined as "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven by a reason having the three modes" (tshul gsum pa can gyi rtags las bsgrub bya gsar du rtogs pa'i rig pa). It arises in dependence upon the three basic types of reasons: reasons of nature ( 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs), reasons of results (rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs), and reasons of imperception (ma dmigs pa'i gtan tshig). Inference for others is defined as "A sentence construction fully clarifying for others the fact seen by the disputant himself, [i.e.,] a reason having the three modes" (rgol ba rang nyid kyi mthong pa'i don tshul gsum pa can gyi gtan tshigs gzhan la rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i tshig sbyor). See Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso 1996a/1999; Brunnhölzl 2004, 178–81; Dreyfus 1997, 316–27; Dunne 2004, 25–35; and Matilal 1998, 108–16. (3) Scriptural authority (or verbal testimony) (āgama, lung) as a valid means of cognition is also called "inferential valid cognition of conviction" (yid ches rjes dpag tshad ma). Dreyfus says (1997, 294), "Nyāya-sūtra I.1.7 explains the epistemological status of testimony: 'Verbal testimony (śabda) is the communication (upadeśa) from a trustworthy person (āpta).'" For Buddhists, the status of scriptural authority as a form of valid cognition is a topic of much discussion. Some consider it a form of inference, others do not. It is generally said to be the means for cognizing that which is extremely hidden (atyantaparokṣha, shin tu lkog gyur). See Tillemans 1999a, 28-32 and 37–51; Tillemans 1999b, 395–404; and Dunne 2004, 230–45. (4) Analogy (or analogical induction) (upamāṇa, nye bar 'jal ba) is the use of examples to bring about cognition of something formerly unknown. Dreyfus says (1997, 529n41) that Buddhist epistemologists consider this to be a form of inference. See also Dunne 2004, 145–7.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	568 The Explanation of "Differentiating the Sugata's Texts" (Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣhya, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i bshad pa) (Toh. 3900; Dg.T. Beijing 63:995–6) is by Jetāri (or Jitāri) (dGra las rgyal ba) (ca. eleventh century). His root text, Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa) (Toh. 3899), contains only eight verses, all of which are almost identical to verses 21–28 of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa). See Mimaki 2000, 234–5. Ruegg states (1981, 100) that Jetāri "was counted by doxographers as a Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (Samala-Alīkākāra branch [Proponents of Staining False Images]). His Sugatamatavibhaṅga-kārikās and Bhāṣya deal with the four main schools of Buddhist thought . . . In the Bhāṣya Jitāri endeavours in particular to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti was in agreement with Nāgārjuna and that he taught the Madhyamaka." The translation follows Dg.T. Beijing: nang du snang ba'i shes pa 'di gzhan yin la phyi rol du snang ba yang gzhan kho na'o/ gnyis po de la yang gnyis med pa yin te/ rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ de'i stobs kyis byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas ni de dag la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bor sgro btags pa. Compare with TOK, II:505.12–15: yang kha cig ni nang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyang gzhan yin la phyi rol tu snang ba de nyid kyang gzhan yin te de gnyis kyang so so rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ kun tu rtog pa de gnyis kyi stobs kyis byung bas gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo gnyis su sgro btags so, "For some, the consciousness that appears internally and what appears externally are different from each other, but they are both simply intuitive reflexive awareness. Conceptuality, which arises through the force of those two, exaggeratedly considers them to be the two entities of percept and perceiver."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	804 For the sake of comparison, the following is a list of Tsongkhapa's enumeration of the eight uncommon theses in his Illumination of the Thought (ACIP S5408@124B): (1-2) [The Prāsaṅgika system] has an uncommon way of refuting an ālaya consciousness that is separate in essence from the six modes of consciousness and reflexive awareness (tshogs drug las ngo bo tha dad pa'i kun gzhi rnam shes dang rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong ma yin pa). (3) It does not accept the use of independently [verifiable] probative arguments to generate [an understanding of] the view of suchness in the mindstream of opponents (rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho na nyid kyi lta ba skyed pa khas mi len pa). (4) It is necessary to accept external objects in the same way that cognition is accepted (shes pa khas len pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa). (5) Shrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize that entities have no nature (nyan rang la dngos po rang bzhin med par rtogs pa yod pa). (6) Clinging to a self-entity of phenomena is posited as an affliction (chos kyi bdag 'dzin nyon mongs su 'jog pa). (7) Disintegration is a [functioning] thing (zhig pa dngos po yin pa). (8) Therefore, [this system] has an uncommon way of positing the three times (de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum gyi 'jog tshul thun mong ma yin pa).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	544 The implication of Jamgön Kongtrul's statements (see also n. 542) is that there is a difference between "the appearance of the dualism of perceived object and perceiving subject" (gzung 'dzin gnyis snang) and "dualistic appearance" (gnyis snang). Not all dualistic appearance is the dualistic appearance of an object and a subject. The dependent nature (cognition, or mind and mental events) appears as a duality (gnyis su snang ba) in that it has an externally oriented aspect and an internally oriented aspect (kha phyi bltas dang nang bltas). Putting this another way, in the Chittamātra system, all cognitions are both other-awareness (gzhan rig) and reflexive awareness (rang rig), but such cognition does not involve an ascertainment of a duality or split. The ascertainment (nges pa) of a duality of perceiver and percept, that is as split into two discrete, separate things, is considered the imagined characteristic. (ALTG)
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	717 The four valid means of cognition (pramāṇa, tshad ma) were propounded by the Nyāyas (Logicians) and became widely accepted in Indian philosophical circles (see Dreyfus 1997, 293–4). Of these four, Buddhists, as followers of the epistemological treatises of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, only accept direct perception and inference as valid forms of cognition. Broadly speaking, Chandrakīrti and his followers were the exception and accepted the use of all four in debate with others. Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso (1996b/2000) says, "the general definition of valid cognition is 'a new and undeceiving awareness'" (gsar du mi bslu ba'i rig pa tha snyad tshad ma spyi'i mtshan nyid); and "the definition from the point of view of dispelling wrong ideas is 'an awareness which clarifies what was not known [previously]'" (ma shes don gsal gyi rig pa log rtog bsal ba'i dbang du byas pa'i mtshan nyid). (In the following paragraphs, the definitions for direct perceptual valid cognition and inferential valid cognition are from Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso 1996b/2000.) (1) Direct perceptual valid cognition (pratyakṣhapramāṇa, mngon sum tshad ma) is defined as "a nonconceptual and nonmistaken awareness" (rtog pa dang bral zhing ma 'khrul pa'i rig pa). It is of four types: sense direct perception (indriya pratyakṣha, dbang po'i mngon sum), mental direct perception (mānasapratyakṣha, yid kyi mngon sum), reflexively aware direct perception (rang rig mngon sum), and yogic direct perception (yogi pratyakṣha, rnal 'byor mngon sum). For definitions of these subcategories, see the Classifications of Mind and Book Six, Part One (TOK, II:233–4). Generally, Tibetan commentators agree that on a conventional level Prāsaṅgikas accept sense, mental, and yogic direct perceptions, but they disagree about whether Prāsaṅgikas accept reflexively aware direct perception. Tsongkhapa, for example, states that Prāsaṅgikas do not accept reflexive awareness, not even conventionally (this is one of the "eight difficult points"; see p. 247 and n. 803 for related sources); whereas Mipham states that Prāsaṅgikas do accept reflexively aware direct perception conventionally (see Pettit 1999, 129 and 497n451). According to Āchārya Lama Tenpa Gyaltsen (ALTG), Mikyö Dorjé often criticizes reflexive awareness, but he does not make a clear statement on whether the Prāsaṅgikas accept it conventionally or reject it completely. It is generally understood that Mikyö Dorjé's refutations of reflexive awareness are only refutations on the level of slight analysis. (2) Inferential valid cognition (anumāṇapramāṇa, rjes dpag tshad ma) is of two types: inference for oneself (rang don rjes dpag) and inference for others (gzhan don rjes dpag). Inference for oneself is defined as "an awareness newly realizing that which is to be proven by a reason having the three modes" (tshul gsum pa can gyi rtags las bsgrub bya gsar du rtogs pa'i rig pa). It arises in dependence upon the three basic types of reasons: reasons of nature ( 'bras bu'i gtan tshigs), reasons of results (rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs), and reasons of imperception (ma dmigs pa'i gtan tshig). Inference for others is defined as "A sentence construction fully clarifying for others the fact seen by the disputant himself, [i.e.,] a reason having the three modes" (rgol ba rang nyid kyi mthong pa'i don tshul gsum pa can gyi gtan tshigs gzhan la rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i tshig sbyor). See Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso 1996a/1999; Brunnhölzl 2004, 178–81; Dreyfus 1997, 316–27; Dunne 2004, 25–35; and Matilal 1998, 108–16. (3) Scriptural authority (or verbal testimony) (āgama, lung) as a valid means of cognition is also called "inferential valid cognition of conviction" (yid ches rjes dpag tshad ma). Dreyfus says (1997, 294), "Nyāya-sūtra I.1.7 explains the epistemological status of testimony: 'Verbal testimony (śabda) is the communication (upadeśa) from a trustworthy person (āpta).'" For Buddhists, the status of scriptural authority as a form of valid cognition is a topic of much discussion. Some consider it a form of inference, others do not. It is generally said to be the means for cognizing that which is extremely hidden (atyantaparokṣha, shin tu lkog gyur). See Tillemans 1999a, 28-32 and 37–51; Tillemans 1999b, 395–404; and Dunne 2004, 230–45. (4) Analogy (or analogical induction) (upamāṇa, nye bar 'jal ba) is the use of examples to bring about cognition of something formerly unknown. Dreyfus says (1997, 529n41) that Buddhist epistemologists consider this to be a form of inference. See also Dunne 2004, 145–7.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	568 The Explanation of "Differentiating the Sugata's Texts" (Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣhya, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i bshad pa) (Toh. 3900; Dg.T. Beijing 63:995–6) is by Jetāri (or Jitāri) (dGra las rgyal ba) (ca. eleventh century). His root text, Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa) (Toh. 3899), contains only eight verses, all of which are almost identical to verses 21–28 of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa). See Mimaki 2000, 234–5. Ruegg states (1981, 100) that Jetāri "was counted by doxographers as a Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (Samala-Alīkākāra branch [Proponents of Staining False Images]). His Sugatamatavibhaṅga-kārikās and Bhāṣya deal with the four main schools of Buddhist thought . . . In the Bhāṣya Jitāri endeavours in particular to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti was in agreement with Nāgārjuna and that he taught the Madhyamaka." The translation follows Dg.T. Beijing: nang du snang ba'i shes pa 'di gzhan yin la phyi rol du snang ba yang gzhan kho na'o/ gnyis po de la yang gnyis med pa yin te/ rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ de'i stobs kyis byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas ni de dag la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bor sgro btags pa. Compare with TOK, II:505.12–15: yang kha cig ni nang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyang gzhan yin la phyi rol tu snang ba de nyid kyang gzhan yin te de gnyis kyang so so rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ kun tu rtog pa de gnyis kyi stobs kyis byung bas gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo gnyis su sgro btags so, "For some, the consciousness that appears internally and what appears externally are different from each other, but they are both simply intuitive reflexive awareness. Conceptuality, which arises through the force of those two, exaggeratedly considers them to be the two entities of percept and perceiver."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	804 For the sake of comparison, the following is a list of Tsongkhapa's enumeration of the eight uncommon theses in his Illumination of the Thought (ACIP S5408@124B): (1-2) [The Prāsaṅgika system] has an uncommon way of refuting an ālaya consciousness that is separate in essence from the six modes of consciousness and reflexive awareness (tshogs drug las ngo bo tha dad pa'i kun gzhi rnam shes dang rang rig 'gog lugs thun mong ma yin pa). (3) It does not accept the use of independently [verifiable] probative arguments to generate [an understanding of] the view of suchness in the mindstream of opponents (rang rgyud kyi sbyor bas phyir rgol gyi rgyud la de kho na nyid kyi lta ba skyed pa khas mi len pa). (4) It is necessary to accept external objects in the same way that cognition is accepted (shes pa khas len pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang khas blang dgos pa). (5) Shrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realize that entities have no nature (nyan rang la dngos po rang bzhin med par rtogs pa yod pa). (6) Clinging to a self-entity of phenomena is posited as an affliction (chos kyi bdag 'dzin nyon mongs su 'jog pa). (7) Disintegration is a [functioning] thing (zhig pa dngos po yin pa). (8) Therefore, [this system] has an uncommon way of positing the three times (de'i rgyu mtshan gyis dus gsum gyi 'jog tshul thun mong ma yin pa).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: ;	;	@@@	@@@	}}	544 The implication of Jamgön Kongtrul's statements (see also n. 542) is that there is a difference between "the appearance of the dualism of perceived object and perceiving subject" (gzung 'dzin gnyis snang) and "dualistic appearance" (gnyis snang). Not all dualistic appearance is the dualistic appearance of an object and a subject. The dependent nature (cognition, or mind and mental events) appears as a duality (gnyis su snang ba) in that it has an externally oriented aspect and an internally oriented aspect (kha phyi bltas dang nang bltas). Putting this another way, in the Chittamātra system, all cognitions are both other-awareness (gzhan rig) and reflexive awareness (rang rig), but such cognition does not involve an ascertainment of a duality or split. The ascertainment (nges pa) of a duality of perceiver and percept, that is as split into two discrete, separate things, is considered the imagined characteristic. (ALTG)
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2572. Parts of the Tibetan tradition, such as Sakya Paṇḍita in his Tshad ma rigs gter (Sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan 1992a, 328) and Gorampa's commentary on it (Go bo rab 'byams pa bsod nams seng ge 1979a, 3:281), sometimes present a threefold division of awareness (rig pa): (1) awareness of something other (gzhan rig), (2) self-awareness (rang rig), and (3) awareness of the lack of nature (rang bzhin med par rig pa). The first means that mind is aware of something that seems to be other than itself, such as outer material objects (sense perception and mental perception). The second refers to mind's being aware of itself in a nondual way, that is, without any identifiable difference between mind as the perceiving subject and mind as the perceived object. The third is the direct realization of the true nature of all phenomena, that is, that they are without any nature. Obviously, (1) pertains only to ordinary beings. Awareness (2) is found in both ordinary beings and noble ones (those who directly perceive the nature of phenomena) in a general sense, though the profundity of nondual experience differs. Awareness (3) occurs only in noble beings from the path of seeing onward. It is also called "the wisdom that realizes identitylessness," "yogic valid perception," or "personally experienced wisdom" (Skt. pratyātmavedanīyajñāna, Tib. so so rang rig pa'i ye shes). The latter term emphasizes that this wisdom is one's own unique, immediate, and vivid experience, not just some imagined idea of something one has heard or read of. Mind's realizing the nature of all phenomena includes mind's being aware of its own ultimate nature, which is the unity of awareness and emptiness. The nature of such a realization is to be free from the triad of something that is aware, something of which it is aware, and the act of being aware, while at the same time being an incontrovertible transformative experience in the noble ones' own minds (Skt. pratyātmāryajñāna, Tib. ‘phags pa'i so so rang gi ye shes). The difference between (2) and (3) is reflected in the rather specific Buddhist use of the Sanskrit words svasaṃvid, svasaṃvedana, and svasaṃvitti (all translated into Tibetan as rang rig) for (2), while pratyātmagati, pratyātmādhigama, pratyātmavid, and the latter's derivatives, such as pratyātmavedya and pratyātmavedanīya (all translated into Tibetan as so so rang rig) are used for (3). More literally, pratyātmavedanīyajñāna means "the wisdom of what is to be experienced or realized personally or by oneself (that is, the nature of phenomena)."Of course, there is some overlap in the semantic range of these two groups of words, and, as the examples of Jñānaśrīmitra and two of the Karmapas in the text below show, the words in the first one may also sometimes be used in the second sense. However, the emphasis in the latter group is clearly on one's own firsthand knowledge or experience of something, be it identitylessness, emptiness, or the union of dharmadhātu and awareness (the nature of one's mind). As for the corresponding Tibetan expressions rang rig and so so rang rig, in themselves, they do not mirror this distinction and are often taken to mean just the same. If the Tibetan tradition gives a distinct explanation of the meaning of so so in so so rang rig pa'i ye shes, this is usually done in two ways. First, in the explanation usually preferred by adherents of shentong, so so refers to the fact that the final unmediated realization of the nature of our mind can be accomplished only by this very mind's wisdom and not by anything extrinsic to it, such as a teacher's instructions or blessings. In other words, the only way to really personally know what the wisdom of a buddha or bodhisattva is like is to experience it in our own mind. In this sense, such wisdom is truly inconceivable and incommunicable, which is part of what the term "personally experienced wisdom" indicates, since it is one's very own "private"experience unshared with others. Of course, in this context, it should be clear that "personal" or "private" does not refer to an individual person in the usual sense, since the wisdom of the noble ones encompasses the very realization that there is no such person or self. Nevertheless, it is an experience that occurs only in distinct mind streams that have been trained in certain ways, while it does not happen in others. The second explanation of so so, usually given by adherents of Rangtong, is that, just like a mirror, this wisdom clearly sees all phenomena in a distinct way without mixing them up. Certain Indian and Tibetan masters, such as Jñānaśrīmitra (one of Maitrīpa's teachers), the Seventh Karmapa, and the Eighth Karmapa, use self-awareness and personally experienced awareness/wisdom as equivalents in the sense of this wisdom's representing the most sublime expression of the principle that mind is able to be aware of itself in a nondual way, that is, free from any aspects of subject and object. Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhi (in Jñānaśrīmitra, Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali, 478.10–13) says: "In Uttaratantra [I.9, we find] the words ‘the dharma is to be personally experienced.' Since it has been said that false imagination exists, there is no refuge other than self-awareness (uttaratantre ca/ pratyātmavedyo dharmaḥ/ ity evākṣaraṃ/ na cābhutaparikalpo 'stīti bruvataḥ svasaṃvedanād anyāc charaṇam)." Obviously, this kind of self-awareness that is a refuge is to be clearly distinguished from the ordinary notion of self-awareness (2), which basically means that all beings are aware of their own direct experiences, such as being happy or sad. The Seventh Karmapa's Ocean of Texts on Reasoning (Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, 2:163) first equates self-awareness and personal experience in a general way: "Perception (the subject [in question]) is established to be free from conception through self-aware perception itself, because it is experienced through self-awareness as a cognition that does not appear as being suitable or not being suitable to conflate terms and referents. For, every person's conceptions that are based on apprehending names and referents as being suitable to be conflated are to be experienced personally by the experiencer that is self-awareness."Later, the Karmapa (ibid., 2:338) also identifies the personally experienced wisdom of a buddha's omniscience as an instance of self-awareness: "It is not contradictory for awareness to be what it is aware of. For, when this awareness knows the minds of others, it must be aware of knowing itself, and the wisdom of the knowledge of all aspects is [also] a personal experience of itself." In this vein, the Eighth Karmapa's Lamp says (19–20, 21, and 41): "The [cognizing] subject that is the type of realization that realizes this very [dharmakāya] does not depend on any other hosts of reference points, but is self-awareness by nature. Therefore, by virtue of this self-awareness's being pure through its very [own] purity, it is not dependent on anything else," and "the great Mādhyamika, venerable Asaṅga, holds that [during the vajra-like samādhi] at the end of the path of familiarization, in this very mind stream that will become a buddha and in which tathāgatahood abides, remedial self-awareness dawns and thus everything to be relinquished [at this point] is relinquished without exception," and "liberation is to have attained the mastery of self-aware wisdom over the sugata heart of one's own mind stream." In addition, the Lamp repeatedly identifies the realization of buddhahood as being self-awareness and self-arisen.