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ཡེ་ཤེས་

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Book	Author/Translator	Note
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	701 Buddhajñānapāda ([Sang rgyas] Ye shes zhabs) (ca. thirteenth century) was invited to Tibet in 1200. He wrote a Madhyamaka text, Entering the Victor's Path (Jinamārgāvatāra, rGyal ba'i lam la 'jug pa), and a commentary on the Abhisamālaṃkāra, The Garlands of Wisdom Lamps (Prajñāpradīpāvalī, Shes rab sgron ma'i 'phreng ba). See Ruegg 1981, 117.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	612 Butön, in his History of Buddhism (II.135), uses this threefold classification: Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti are Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, Mādhyamikas Who Employ Worldly Consensus. The master Bhāvaviveka and others are Sautrāntika- Mādhyamikas. Jñānagarbha, Shrīgupta, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, Haribhadra, and others are Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas (sangs rgyas bskyang dang zla grags dbu ma thal 'gyur 'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma/ slob dpon bha bya la sogs mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma/ yes shes snying po/ dpal sbas/ zhi ba 'tsho/ padma'i ngang tshul/ seng ge bzang po la sogs pa rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma). See Obermiller 1932, 133–4. According to Mimaki (1983, 161–2), the fourteenth-century Kadampa master Upa Lo-sel (dBus pa blo gsal) also employed this threefold classification with the following two differences from Butön: Upa Lo-sel does not refer to Mādhyamikas Who Employ Worldly Consensus as Prāsaṅgikas, and he lists Jñānagarbha as a Mādhyamika Who Employs Worldly Consensus. (Upa Lo-sel also gives the twofold classification of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.) Yeshé Dé (Ye shes sde), who lived in the early ninth century, is credited with writing the first Tibetan doxography, Distinctions of the View (lTa ba'i khyad pa), in which he refers to Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogāchāra-Madhyamaka, with Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita being the representatives of those respectively.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	568 The Explanation of "Differentiating the Sugata's Texts" (Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣhya, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i bshad pa) (Toh. 3900; Dg.T. Beijing 63:995–6) is by Jetāri (or Jitāri) (dGra las rgyal ba) (ca. eleventh century). His root text, Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa) (Toh. 3899), contains only eight verses, all of which are almost identical to verses 21–28 of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa). See Mimaki 2000, 234–5. Ruegg states (1981, 100) that Jetāri "was counted by doxographers as a Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (Samala-Alīkākāra branch [Proponents of Staining False Images]). His Sugatamatavibhaṅga-kārikās and Bhāṣya deal with the four main schools of Buddhist thought . . . In the Bhāṣya Jitāri endeavours in particular to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti was in agreement with Nāgārjuna and that he taught the Madhyamaka." The translation follows Dg.T. Beijing: nang du snang ba'i shes pa 'di gzhan yin la phyi rol du snang ba yang gzhan kho na'o/ gnyis po de la yang gnyis med pa yin te/ rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ de'i stobs kyis byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas ni de dag la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bor sgro btags pa. Compare with TOK, II:505.12–15: yang kha cig ni nang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyang gzhan yin la phyi rol tu snang ba de nyid kyang gzhan yin te de gnyis kyang so so rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ kun tu rtog pa de gnyis kyi stobs kyis byung bas gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo gnyis su sgro btags so, "For some, the consciousness that appears internally and what appears externally are different from each other, but they are both simply intuitive reflexive awareness. Conceptuality, which arises through the force of those two, exaggeratedly considers them to be the two entities of percept and perceiver."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	886 For discussions related to illustrative primordial wisdom (also translated as "example- wisdom" or "example pristine awareness") (dpe'i ye shes), the primordial wisdom of unified bliss and emptiness (bde stong zung 'jug gi ye shes), and the connate primordial wisdom of melting bliss (zhu bde lhan skyes kyi ye shes), see Kongtrul 2005, 27–9, 231–3, and passim.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	849 The Fourth Vajra Point, verse 28. The full verse reads: Because the primordial wisdom of buddha[hood] is present in all sentient beings, [because] the stainless nature is nondual, and because the buddha-potential is named after its result, all beings are said to possess the buddha-garbha (heart). sangs rgyas ye shes sems can tshogs zhugs phyir/ rang bzhin dri med de ni gnyis med de/ sangs rgyas rigs la de 'bras nyer brtags phyir/ 'gro kun sangs rgyas snying po can du gsungs.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	88 Shang Yeshé Dé (Zhang ye shes sde) wrote Distinctions of the View (lTa ba'i khyad par).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	297 The four primordial wisdoms (jñāna, ye shes) are mirrorlike wisdom (me long lta bu'i ye shes), discriminating wisdom (sor rtogs ye shes), the wisdom of equality (mnyam nyid ye shes), and the wisdom that accomplishes activities (bya grub ye shes). When five wisdoms are listed, the fifth is the wisdom of the dharmadhatu (chos dbyings ye shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	285 Bodhibhadra (Byang chub bzang po) (ca. 1000) was a master at Nālandā and one of Atīsha's teachers. His Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar) (Toh. 3852; Dg.T. Beijing 57:891) is an explanation of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa) (Toh. 3851; Dg.T. Beijing 57:851).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	75 Bodhibhadra wrote a Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	565 The doxographical categories of Proponents of Real Images (Satyākāravādin, rNam bden pa) and Proponents of False Images (Alīkākāravādin, rNam rdzun pa) are found in later Indian Buddhist works, where, in the context of Yogāchāra, the term "Proponents of Images" (Sākāravādin, rNam pa dang bcas pa) is sometimes used for Proponents of Real Images, and "Proponents of Nonexistent Images" (Nirākāravādin, rNam pa med pa) for Proponents of False Images (Jamgön Kongtrul states the latter on p. 189). Note that in a pan-Buddhist context "Proponents of Images" is used for both Sautrāntika and Yogāchāra Proponents of Real Images, and "Proponents of Nonexistent Images" are either Vaibhāṣhikas, because they do not posit "images" (in which case the term is better translated as Proponents of No Images), or Yogāchāra Proponents of False Images, because they do not accept that images are real. (Also note that the categories of Proponents of Images and Proponents of No Images are used in non-Buddhist Indian philosophical circles.) Bodhibhadra in his Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar) (Dg.T. Beijing 57:895) states: There are two types of Yogāchāras: Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. The master Dignāga and others assert the positions of Proponents of Images. They teach that the image is the dependent (paratantra, gzhan dbang), as is said [in Dignāga's Examination of Objects of Observation (Ālambanaparīkṣhā, dMigs pa brtags pa), verse 6ac]: "The entity of the inner knowable object, which appears as if it were external, is the referent." They discuss [only] six modes of consciousness. Proponents of Nonexistent Images include the master Asaṅga and others. They state that images are the imagined (parikalpita, kun brtags) [and] are like the floaters seen by the visually impaired, since it is said [in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Chapter 8]: "If referents were to exist as referents, there could be no nonconceptual wisdom. If that [wisdom] does not exist, the attainment of buddhahood is not feasible." And [in the same text]: "Where nonconceptual wisdom occurs, no object appears. One must comprehend that there are no referents. Since they do not exist, there is no cognition." They state that there are eight modes of consciousness, [although] some say that there is [just] one [mode of consciousness], which is [a position also held by] some Proponents of Images. 'dir rnal 'byor spyod pa ni rnam pa gnyis te/ rnam pa dang bcas pa dang/ rnam pa med pa'o/ de la rnam pa dang bcas pa ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po la sogs pa dag gi 'dod pa ste/ rnam pa gzhan gyi dbang du ston pas ji skad du/ nang gi shes bya'i ngo bo ni/ phyi rol ltar snang gang yin de/ don yin zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug tu smra ba'o. rnam pa de med pa ni slob dpon 'phags pa thogs med la sogs pa ste/ de dag rnam pa kun tu brtags pa rab rib can gyis skra shad la sogs pa ltar smra bas/ don ni don du grub 'gyur na/ mi rtog ye shes med par 'gyur/ de med pas na sangs rgyas nyid/ thob par 'thad pa ma yin no/ de de bzhin du/ mi rtog ye shes rgyu ba la/ don kun snang ba med phyir yang/ don med khong du chud par bya/ de med pas na rnam rig med/ ces brjod cing rnam par shes pa'i tshogs brgyad dang/ kha cig gcig pur smra ba ste/ gcig pu nyid ni rnam pa dang bcas pa dag la yang kha cig go. (See Kajiyama 1998, 154; Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 36; and Keenan 1992, 98.) Readers should be aware that the views on classifying the thought of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are very varied and complicated, ranging from the above to that they were Mādhyamikas. For a discussion of different doxographical categorizations of Dharmakīrti's thought, see Dreyfus 1997, 20–21 and 428–42. Mokṣhākaragupta in his Discourse on Logic (Tarkabhāṣhā, rTog ge'i skad) also divides Yogāchāras into Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. See Kajiyama 1965 and 1998, 148 and 154–8. Maitrīpa in his Precious Garland of Suchness (Tattvaratnāvalī, De kho na nyid kyi rin chen phreng ba) (Dg.T. Beijing 26:340–2) divides Yogāchāras into Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. Tillemans says (1990, 41n91), "Note that amongst later Vijñānavādins, Ratnākaraśānti becomes the principal representative of Alīkākāravāda [Proponents of False Images], whereas Jñānaśrīmitra is probably the principal Satyākāravādin [Proponent of Real Images]." (Ratnākarashānti refers in the colophon to his Instructions that Ornament the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāropadesha, dBu ma rgyan gyi man ngag) to his teachings as being that of the "Mahāyāna Mādhyamika [Proponents of] Cognition" (Mahāyāna vijñapti madhyamaka, Theg chen rnam rig dbu ma). Although it seems clear from a number of his works that Ratnākarashānti was a Proponent of False Images, he may not have considered himself a Chittamātra as distinct from a Mādhyamika. Nevertheless most of his writings are included in the Chittamātra (sems tsam) section of the Tengyur. See Ruegg 1981, 122–4.) According to Ruegg (1981, 110), Dharmapāla and his students Ratnakīrti and Jñānashrīmitra were Proponents of Real Images. Dreyfus says (1997, 364) that Dharmottara was a Proponent of False Images. See also n. 562 above for remarks concerning the views of Proponents of Real Images and Proponents of False Images.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	72 Jñānasāra-samuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa. On the authorship of this text, see Mimaki 1987. For a translation, see Mimaki 2000.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	884 Reading TOK, II:558.24 lhan cig byed pa bde ba chen po'i ye shes as lhan cig skyes pa bde ba chen po'i ye shes following ktgr's oral commentary. "Connate" (sahaja, lhan cig skyes pa) is also translated as "innate," and "co-emergent."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	338 Ye shes la 'jug pa.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	809 Jamgön Kongtrul makes a similar statement in his Irrepressible Lion's Roar (8): "The general philosophical tenet system of the definitive-meaning Madhyamaka and three Dharma Treatises of Maitreya were spread widely by many excellent disciple lineages, such as [those originating with] Dignāga and Sthiramati. Because it was difficult for others to fathom, the uncommon [philosophical tenet system of] these [texts of Maitreya] was transmitted orally to supreme disciples, and the texts of the Highest Continuum and Differentiation of Phenomena and Their Nature were hidden as treasures. Thus, the two Ornaments and the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes were translated and explained by Lotsāwa Pal-tsek (Lo tsā ba dPal brtsegs) and Shang Yeshé Dé (Zhang ye shes sde) during the period of the early spreading [of the dharma]." See also Hookham 1991, 269–70. Sthiramati (Blo gros brtan pa) (ca. 470–550) was one of Vasubandhu's main students, who wrote ten texts that are included in the Tengyur, including commentaries on the Ornament of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Differentiation of Phenomena and Their Nature, and works by Vasubandhu.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	599 Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa, by Āryadeva, verse 26ab. Toh. 3851, f. 27b2; Dg.T. Beijing 57:853. Dg.T. Beijing reads gzung dang 'dzin pa las grol ba'i/ rnam shes dam pa'i don du yod. TOK, II:509.20–21 has gzung dang 'dzin pa rnam grol ba'i/ rnam par shes pa don dam yod. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	840 The consummate nature is the ultimate because it is transmundane primordial wisdom ( 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes). It is inherent absence, or non-nature, in that it is the nature that is devoid of percepts and perceivers (yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de/ de bas na gzung ba dang 'dzin pa med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa'o). Sthiramati's Sub-Commentary on the "Thirty Verses" (Triṃshikaṭīkā, Sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad); Dg.T. Beijing 78:133–4.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	696 Jñānagarbha (Ye shes snying po) (eighth century) was a master at Nālandā, student of Shrīgupta, and the ordaining abbot and teacher of Shāntarakṣhita. He wrote the Differentiation of the Two Truths (Satyadvaya-vibhaṇga, bDen gnyis rnam 'byed). See Eckel 1987. Butön considers Jñānagarbha to be a Yogāchāra-Madhyamaka (see Obermiller 1932, 134).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	701 Buddhajñānapāda ([Sang rgyas] Ye shes zhabs) (ca. thirteenth century) was invited to Tibet in 1200. He wrote a Madhyamaka text, Entering the Victor's Path (Jinamārgāvatāra, rGyal ba'i lam la 'jug pa), and a commentary on the Abhisamālaṃkāra, The Garlands of Wisdom Lamps (Prajñāpradīpāvalī, Shes rab sgron ma'i 'phreng ba). See Ruegg 1981, 117.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	612 Butön, in his History of Buddhism (II.135), uses this threefold classification: Buddhapālita and Chandrakīrti are Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas, Mādhyamikas Who Employ Worldly Consensus. The master Bhāvaviveka and others are Sautrāntika- Mādhyamikas. Jñānagarbha, Shrīgupta, Shāntarakṣhita, Kamalashīla, Haribhadra, and others are Yogāchāra-Mādhyamikas (sangs rgyas bskyang dang zla grags dbu ma thal 'gyur 'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma/ slob dpon bha bya la sogs mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma/ yes shes snying po/ dpal sbas/ zhi ba 'tsho/ padma'i ngang tshul/ seng ge bzang po la sogs pa rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma). See Obermiller 1932, 133–4. According to Mimaki (1983, 161–2), the fourteenth-century Kadampa master Upa Lo-sel (dBus pa blo gsal) also employed this threefold classification with the following two differences from Butön: Upa Lo-sel does not refer to Mādhyamikas Who Employ Worldly Consensus as Prāsaṅgikas, and he lists Jñānagarbha as a Mādhyamika Who Employs Worldly Consensus. (Upa Lo-sel also gives the twofold classification of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.) Yeshé Dé (Ye shes sde), who lived in the early ninth century, is credited with writing the first Tibetan doxography, Distinctions of the View (lTa ba'i khyad pa), in which he refers to Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogāchāra-Madhyamaka, with Bhāvaviveka and Shāntarakṣhita being the representatives of those respectively.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	568 The Explanation of "Differentiating the Sugata's Texts" (Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣhya, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i bshad pa) (Toh. 3900; Dg.T. Beijing 63:995–6) is by Jetāri (or Jitāri) (dGra las rgyal ba) (ca. eleventh century). His root text, Differentiating the Sugata's Texts (Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā, bDe bar gshegs pa'i gzhung rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa) (Toh. 3899), contains only eight verses, all of which are almost identical to verses 21–28 of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa). See Mimaki 2000, 234–5. Ruegg states (1981, 100) that Jetāri "was counted by doxographers as a Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (Samala-Alīkākāra branch [Proponents of Staining False Images]). His Sugatamatavibhaṅga-kārikās and Bhāṣya deal with the four main schools of Buddhist thought . . . In the Bhāṣya Jitāri endeavours in particular to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti was in agreement with Nāgārjuna and that he taught the Madhyamaka." The translation follows Dg.T. Beijing: nang du snang ba'i shes pa 'di gzhan yin la phyi rol du snang ba yang gzhan kho na'o/ gnyis po de la yang gnyis med pa yin te/ rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ de'i stobs kyis byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas ni de dag la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bor sgro btags pa. Compare with TOK, II:505.12–15: yang kha cig ni nang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyang gzhan yin la phyi rol tu snang ba de nyid kyang gzhan yin te de gnyis kyang so so rang rig pa tsam yin pa'i phyir ro/ kun tu rtog pa de gnyis kyi stobs kyis byung bas gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo gnyis su sgro btags so, "For some, the consciousness that appears internally and what appears externally are different from each other, but they are both simply intuitive reflexive awareness. Conceptuality, which arises through the force of those two, exaggeratedly considers them to be the two entities of percept and perceiver."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	886 For discussions related to illustrative primordial wisdom (also translated as "example- wisdom" or "example pristine awareness") (dpe'i ye shes), the primordial wisdom of unified bliss and emptiness (bde stong zung 'jug gi ye shes), and the connate primordial wisdom of melting bliss (zhu bde lhan skyes kyi ye shes), see Kongtrul 2005, 27–9, 231–3, and passim.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	849 The Fourth Vajra Point, verse 28. The full verse reads: Because the primordial wisdom of buddha[hood] is present in all sentient beings, [because] the stainless nature is nondual, and because the buddha-potential is named after its result, all beings are said to possess the buddha-garbha (heart). sangs rgyas ye shes sems can tshogs zhugs phyir/ rang bzhin dri med de ni gnyis med de/ sangs rgyas rigs la de 'bras nyer brtags phyir/ 'gro kun sangs rgyas snying po can du gsungs.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	88 Shang Yeshé Dé (Zhang ye shes sde) wrote Distinctions of the View (lTa ba'i khyad par).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	297 The four primordial wisdoms (jñāna, ye shes) are mirrorlike wisdom (me long lta bu'i ye shes), discriminating wisdom (sor rtogs ye shes), the wisdom of equality (mnyam nyid ye shes), and the wisdom that accomplishes activities (bya grub ye shes). When five wisdoms are listed, the fifth is the wisdom of the dharmadhatu (chos dbyings ye shes).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	285 Bodhibhadra (Byang chub bzang po) (ca. 1000) was a master at Nālandā and one of Atīsha's teachers. His Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar) (Toh. 3852; Dg.T. Beijing 57:891) is an explanation of Āryadeva's Compendium on the Heart of Wisdom (Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa) (Toh. 3851; Dg.T. Beijing 57:851).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	75 Bodhibhadra wrote a Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar).
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	565 The doxographical categories of Proponents of Real Images (Satyākāravādin, rNam bden pa) and Proponents of False Images (Alīkākāravādin, rNam rdzun pa) are found in later Indian Buddhist works, where, in the context of Yogāchāra, the term "Proponents of Images" (Sākāravādin, rNam pa dang bcas pa) is sometimes used for Proponents of Real Images, and "Proponents of Nonexistent Images" (Nirākāravādin, rNam pa med pa) for Proponents of False Images (Jamgön Kongtrul states the latter on p. 189). Note that in a pan-Buddhist context "Proponents of Images" is used for both Sautrāntika and Yogāchāra Proponents of Real Images, and "Proponents of Nonexistent Images" are either Vaibhāṣhikas, because they do not posit "images" (in which case the term is better translated as Proponents of No Images), or Yogāchāra Proponents of False Images, because they do not accept that images are real. (Also note that the categories of Proponents of Images and Proponents of No Images are used in non-Buddhist Indian philosophical circles.) Bodhibhadra in his Commentary on the "Compendium on the Heart of Primordial Wisdom" (Jñānasārasamuchchaya-nāma-nibandhana, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa zhes bya ba'i bshad sbyar) (Dg.T. Beijing 57:895) states: There are two types of Yogāchāras: Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. The master Dignāga and others assert the positions of Proponents of Images. They teach that the image is the dependent (paratantra, gzhan dbang), as is said [in Dignāga's Examination of Objects of Observation (Ālambanaparīkṣhā, dMigs pa brtags pa), verse 6ac]: "The entity of the inner knowable object, which appears as if it were external, is the referent." They discuss [only] six modes of consciousness. Proponents of Nonexistent Images include the master Asaṅga and others. They state that images are the imagined (parikalpita, kun brtags) [and] are like the floaters seen by the visually impaired, since it is said [in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Chapter 8]: "If referents were to exist as referents, there could be no nonconceptual wisdom. If that [wisdom] does not exist, the attainment of buddhahood is not feasible." And [in the same text]: "Where nonconceptual wisdom occurs, no object appears. One must comprehend that there are no referents. Since they do not exist, there is no cognition." They state that there are eight modes of consciousness, [although] some say that there is [just] one [mode of consciousness], which is [a position also held by] some Proponents of Images. 'dir rnal 'byor spyod pa ni rnam pa gnyis te/ rnam pa dang bcas pa dang/ rnam pa med pa'o/ de la rnam pa dang bcas pa ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po la sogs pa dag gi 'dod pa ste/ rnam pa gzhan gyi dbang du ston pas ji skad du/ nang gi shes bya'i ngo bo ni/ phyi rol ltar snang gang yin de/ don yin zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug tu smra ba'o. rnam pa de med pa ni slob dpon 'phags pa thogs med la sogs pa ste/ de dag rnam pa kun tu brtags pa rab rib can gyis skra shad la sogs pa ltar smra bas/ don ni don du grub 'gyur na/ mi rtog ye shes med par 'gyur/ de med pas na sangs rgyas nyid/ thob par 'thad pa ma yin no/ de de bzhin du/ mi rtog ye shes rgyu ba la/ don kun snang ba med phyir yang/ don med khong du chud par bya/ de med pas na rnam rig med/ ces brjod cing rnam par shes pa'i tshogs brgyad dang/ kha cig gcig pur smra ba ste/ gcig pu nyid ni rnam pa dang bcas pa dag la yang kha cig go. (See Kajiyama 1998, 154; Tola and Dragonetti 2004, 36; and Keenan 1992, 98.) Readers should be aware that the views on classifying the thought of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are very varied and complicated, ranging from the above to that they were Mādhyamikas. For a discussion of different doxographical categorizations of Dharmakīrti's thought, see Dreyfus 1997, 20–21 and 428–42. Mokṣhākaragupta in his Discourse on Logic (Tarkabhāṣhā, rTog ge'i skad) also divides Yogāchāras into Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. See Kajiyama 1965 and 1998, 148 and 154–8. Maitrīpa in his Precious Garland of Suchness (Tattvaratnāvalī, De kho na nyid kyi rin chen phreng ba) (Dg.T. Beijing 26:340–2) divides Yogāchāras into Proponents of Images and Proponents of Nonexistent Images. Tillemans says (1990, 41n91), "Note that amongst later Vijñānavādins, Ratnākaraśānti becomes the principal representative of Alīkākāravāda [Proponents of False Images], whereas Jñānaśrīmitra is probably the principal Satyākāravādin [Proponent of Real Images]." (Ratnākarashānti refers in the colophon to his Instructions that Ornament the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāropadesha, dBu ma rgyan gyi man ngag) to his teachings as being that of the "Mahāyāna Mādhyamika [Proponents of] Cognition" (Mahāyāna vijñapti madhyamaka, Theg chen rnam rig dbu ma). Although it seems clear from a number of his works that Ratnākarashānti was a Proponent of False Images, he may not have considered himself a Chittamātra as distinct from a Mādhyamika. Nevertheless most of his writings are included in the Chittamātra (sems tsam) section of the Tengyur. See Ruegg 1981, 122–4.) According to Ruegg (1981, 110), Dharmapāla and his students Ratnakīrti and Jñānashrīmitra were Proponents of Real Images. Dreyfus says (1997, 364) that Dharmottara was a Proponent of False Images. See also n. 562 above for remarks concerning the views of Proponents of Real Images and Proponents of False Images.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	72 Jñānasāra-samuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa. On the authorship of this text, see Mimaki 1987. For a translation, see Mimaki 2000.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	884 Reading TOK, II:558.24 lhan cig byed pa bde ba chen po'i ye shes as lhan cig skyes pa bde ba chen po'i ye shes following ktgr's oral commentary. "Connate" (sahaja, lhan cig skyes pa) is also translated as "innate," and "co-emergent."
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	338 Ye shes la 'jug pa.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	809 Jamgön Kongtrul makes a similar statement in his Irrepressible Lion's Roar (8): "The general philosophical tenet system of the definitive-meaning Madhyamaka and three Dharma Treatises of Maitreya were spread widely by many excellent disciple lineages, such as [those originating with] Dignāga and Sthiramati. Because it was difficult for others to fathom, the uncommon [philosophical tenet system of] these [texts of Maitreya] was transmitted orally to supreme disciples, and the texts of the Highest Continuum and Differentiation of Phenomena and Their Nature were hidden as treasures. Thus, the two Ornaments and the Differentiation of the Middle and the Extremes were translated and explained by Lotsāwa Pal-tsek (Lo tsā ba dPal brtsegs) and Shang Yeshé Dé (Zhang ye shes sde) during the period of the early spreading [of the dharma]." See also Hookham 1991, 269–70. Sthiramati (Blo gros brtan pa) (ca. 470–550) was one of Vasubandhu's main students, who wrote ten texts that are included in the Tengyur, including commentaries on the Ornament of the Mahāyāna Sūtras, Differentiation of Phenomena and Their Nature, and works by Vasubandhu.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	599 Jñānasārasamuchchaya, Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa, by Āryadeva, verse 26ab. Toh. 3851, f. 27b2; Dg.T. Beijing 57:853. Dg.T. Beijing reads gzung dang 'dzin pa las grol ba'i/ rnam shes dam pa'i don du yod. TOK, II:509.20–21 has gzung dang 'dzin pa rnam grol ba'i/ rnam par shes pa don dam yod. See Mimaki 2000, 240.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	840 The consummate nature is the ultimate because it is transmundane primordial wisdom ( 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes). It is inherent absence, or non-nature, in that it is the nature that is devoid of percepts and perceivers (yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid de/ de bas na gzung ba dang 'dzin pa med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa'o). Sthiramati's Sub-Commentary on the "Thirty Verses" (Triṃshikaṭīkā, Sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad); Dg.T. Beijing 78:133–4.
Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Callahan, E.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	696 Jñānagarbha (Ye shes snying po) (eighth century) was a master at Nālandā, student of Shrīgupta, and the ordaining abbot and teacher of Shāntarakṣhita. He wrote the Differentiation of the Two Truths (Satyadvaya-vibhaṇga, bDen gnyis rnam 'byed). See Eckel 1987. Butön considers Jñānagarbha to be a Yogāchāra-Madhyamaka (see Obermiller 1932, 134).
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	13. Two collections of texts primarily concerned with the three inner tantras of the Nyingma school, contained in nine and thirty-three volumes, respectively. Kama (bka'-ma) is the collection of canonical teachings. Terma (gter-ma) refers to treasure teachings, i.e., the texts, relics, and the transmissions of teachings concealed by Guru Padmasambhava and his consort Yeshé Tsogyel (Ye-shes mTsho-rgyal).
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	34. Ignorance manifests as the pristine wisdom of the sphere of reality (dharma-dhātujñāna, chos dbyings ye shes); hatred manifests as mirror-like pristine wisdom (ādarśajñāna, me long lta bu'i ye shes); pride manifests as the pristine wisdom of equality (samatājñāna, mnyam nyid ye shes); attachment manifests as the pristine wisdom of discernment (pratyavekṣājñāna, so sor rtogs ye shes); and jealousy manifests as the pristine wisdom of accomplishing aims (kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna, bya sgrub ye shes).
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	24. Sumpa Kenpo (Sum-pa mKhan-po Ye-shes dPal-'byor) (1704-1788), born in Amdo, was a famous Tibetan author who wrote on subjects such as medicine, astrology, history, and Buddhism.
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	18. The four pristine wisdoms (catvārijñāna, ye shes bzhi): the mirror-like pristine wisdom (ādarśajñāna, me long lta bu'i ye shes), the pristine wisdom of discernment (pratyavekṣaṇajñāna, so sor rtog pa'i ye shes), the pristine wisdom of equality (samatājñāna, mnyam nyid kyi ye shes), the pristine wisdom of accomplishing aims (kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna, bya ba grub pa'i ye shes).
Myriad Worlds (2003)	{{#arraymap: 'jam mgon kong sprul;Kalu Rinpoché Translation Group;McLeod, I.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	25. Atīśa was an Indian saint who in 1042 came to Tibet at the invitation of Lhalama Yeshé Ö (lHa-bla-ma Ye-shes-'od) and by the order of Tārā, his tutelary deity. When Nagtso the Translator invited the saint to Tibet, the abbot of Vikramaśīla made him promise to lead Atīśa back after three years. When three years later they were approaching Nepal, however, they heard that the road was blocked, so Dromtön ('Brom-ston), who would be Atīśa's successor, asked the master to visit central Tibet. Atīśa did so, greatly benefiting Tibetan Buddhism. He did not return to India, and he died at Nyetang (sNye-thang) in 1054.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2145. Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche (oral communication, July 25, 2013) explains the four pāramitās and their close connection to the presentation of ultimate reality in the vajrayāna as follows. (1) As for the pāramitā of supreme purity, ultimately, the tathāgata heart is primordially unobscured by, and primordially liberated from, any adventitious stains. This represents its "natural purity."On the level of seeming reality, the tathāgata heart appears to be obscured by the adventitious stains together with their latent tendencies. Once all of these have been relinquished through the path, the tathāgata heart also possesses "the purity of having been freed from adventitious stains." This twofold purity of the tathāgata heart represents the pāramitā of supreme purity. This description is very close to the vajrayāna's speaking of "the inseparability of the two realities that is the great purity and equality" (Tib. dagga mnyam chen po bden gnyis dbyer med), "apparitional existence's being primordial buddhahood" (Tib. snag srid ye nas sangs ryas) and "the kāya of complete purity" (suviśuddhikāya). (2) As for the pāramitā of the supreme self, ordinary beings assume the existence of a self and cling to it, while śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas hold on to the view of there being no self. Just as ordinary beings are afraid of the nonexistence of a self, so śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are afraid of the existence of a self. However, in the pāramitā of the supreme self, both of these views and attitudes are completely transcended. For, ultimately, any reference points about a self as well as any reference points about the lack of a self are equally nothing but wrong views. The basic nature that is beyond all reference points of self and no-self represents the primordially present buddha wisdom that pervades and dwells in everything. This is the pāramitā of the supreme self, which is also called "wisdom dharmakāya" (jñānadharmakāya; as explained in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra). In the vajrayāna, this corresponds to the teachings on "vajra pride" and so on. (3) The pāramitā of supreme bliss means that the tathāgata heart is completely free from all elements of clinging. Also, on the level of seeming reality, all kinds of manifestations of the reality of suffering and the reality of the origin of suffering are experienced. That is, there are many phenomena that move and change, and whatever has the nature of moving and changing has the nature of suffering. Ultimately, the basic nature is without any movement and change, and to abide in that basic nature entails the experience of bliss. In the vajrayāna, this is expressed as "the wisdom of great bliss" and "immutable wisdom" (Tib. 'pho med ye shes). In other words, if there is no movement or transference (Tib. 'pho ba), there is bliss, which is also called "the kāya of great bliss" (mahāsukhakāya). (4) The pāramitā of supreme permanence refers to buddha wisdom's never changing into anything other than this very wisdom. In the fruitional buddha wisdom, there is no clinging to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa being different. Rather, the complete equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is realized as the great unconditioned state, which is free from any extremes of clinging to entities or nonentities. In the vajrayāna, this corresponds to "the vajrakāya,"which cannot be changed through anything whatsoever, just like a vajra or a diamond. A diamond cuts all other gems, but it cannot be cut by anything. Likewise, the nature of the mind cannot be altered by anything, and it is solely from this perspective that it is called "permanent." It is not referred to as permanent because there is some permanent entity called "the nature of the mind" or "tathāgata heart." Thus, the notion of permanence here is not like the one in elementary texts such as The Collected Topics (Tib. Bsdus grva) or in the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools. Rather, according to Sakya Pandita, even Dharmakīrti in his teachings on valid cognition used "permanent"only in the sense of being the reverse of "impermanent"but not in the sense of a permanently existent entity. In other words, when the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is realized, there is no clinging to any extremes such as permanence and impermanence. This is what is understood by the pāramitā of supreme permanence.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2680. Compare Laṅkāvatārasūtra X.256–57 (D107, fol. 168b.5–6; translation according to the Sanskrit, the Kangyur versions, and the versions quoted in different Indian texts): By relying on mere mind One does not imagine outer objects. By resting in the focal object of suchness, One should go beyond mere mind too. Having gone beyond mere mind, One must even go beyond nonappearance. The yogin who rests in nonappearance Sees the mahāyāna. The negative in line 257d (which obviously changes the meaning significantly) is also found in the Kangyur versions of the sūtra, but it is lacking in the identical verses 54–55 in Nāgārjuna's Bhāvanākrama and the citations of these two verses from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra in Indian treatises such as Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (D3885, fol. 79b.3–4), Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā (D3886, fols. 128b.2–129a.3) and first Bhāvanākrama (D3915, fol. 33a.3–33b.6), Jñānakīrti's Tattvāvatāra (D3709, fols. 63b.1–65a.2), and Ratnākaraśānti's texts. In his translation of the sūtra, Suzuki (1979, 247) says that most Sanskrit manuscripts have na ("not"), but that one has sa ("he"). Nanjio's Sanskrit edition also has sa. Besides that, the main differences in these verses hinge on how one understands the two occurrences of "nonappearance." Kamalaśīla's detailed explanation of these verses in his Bhāvanākrama (translation in Brunnhölzl 2004, 300–302) takes the first "nonappearance" as referring to the cognition that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended, and this cognition is to be transcended. The second one signifies the wisdom in which not even nondual wisdom appears, which is the path of seeing—the true seeing of the mahāyāna. This means that there is nothing to be seen when the light of perfect wisdom dawns through the examination of all phenomena with the eye of prajñā. However, such nonseeing of any phenomenon is not like being blind, closing one's eyes, or not mentally engaging in seeing. The Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā adds that it is through self-awareness in meditative equipoise that the yogin's mind is experienced as being nondual and without appearance and is described accordingly during subsequent attainment. Thus, though wisdom does not appear as something that can be referred to as nondual wisdom (or anything else, for that matter), since all phenomena lack a nature of their own, given Kamalaśīla's mentioning of the light of wisdom and self-awareness, at least in terms of experiential events on the subject side, he does not seem to refer to a total lack of appearance of anything whatsoever in meditative equipoise. Ratnākaraśānti's Prajñāpāramitopadeśā (D4079, fols. 161a.5–162a.4) explains these verses according to the four yogas of focusing on (1) entities, (2) mere mind, (3) suchness, and (4) nonappearance. (1) The first yoga is taught implicitly—as long as one does not identify phenomena as such and such, one is not able to apprehend their emptiness either. (2) The second yoga refers to seeing these phenomena as being mere mind empty of apprehender and apprehended, which still entails appearance. (3) The third yoga means to apprehend the nonappearance of the characteristics of phenomena, viewing them as sheer lucidity. (4) The fourth yoga is the seeing by virtue of the nonappearance of any characteristics of both phenomena and the nature of phenomena. In more detail, "mere mind"in the first line of these two verses refers to the cognition of focusing on mere mind, which represents yoga (2). "Not imagine"means to go beyond yoga (1) of still imagining or examining external referents. "The focal object of suchness"refers to yoga (3)—wisdom's focusing on suchness, with "having gone beyond mere mind"meaning to continue to train in this, while not yet having accomplished something previously nonexistent. Such an accomplishment is marked by "One must even go beyond nonappearance." Here "nonappearance"means that the characteristics of phenomena do not appear, which means that one focuses on suchness alone. To go beyond even that is indicated by "the yogin who rests in nonappearance,"which refers to seeing that the characteristics of phenomena and the nature of phenomena do not appear at all. This means resting in yoga (4). "Mahāyāna"refers to the uncontaminated path of bodhisattvas superior to śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. "Sees"means perceive directly because the wisdom at this stage is the mahāyāna. As for how one proceeds through this mahāyāna, who proceeds, and where to, the next verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (X.258) says: Peace is entered effortlessly, Purified through aspiration prayers. The highest identityless wisdom Sees the mahāyāna. As for how one proceeds, "effortlessly"means that one transits through the supramundane bhūmis without exertion. These bhūmis are "peace"because they lack afflictions and conceptions. "Purified through aspiration prayers"means that inferior forms of awakening are ruled out. As for who proceeds and to where, "identityless wisdom" is so because it is utterly without appearance. It is "the highest"because all obscurations, including their latent tendencies, are relinquished. This means the bodhicitta of a buddha, which will be seen by yogins of the mahāyāna. As mentioned above, Jñānakīrti's Tattvāvatāra (P4532, fols. 70b.1–72a.6) explains X.256 in a rather standard way by matching it with the first three of the four yogic practices: (1) outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind, (2) thus, outer objects are not observed, and (3) with outer objects' being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either. On X.257 (corresponding to (4) not observing both apprehender and apprehended, nonduality or suchness is observed), he comments that since suchness is unborn, it neither exists as an entity nor the lack of entity. This means that suchness is the complete lack of reference points, since entities and the lack of entity include all possible reference points. Through realizing that, all beings are understood as having the nature of the dharmakāya, thus going beyond the understanding of mere mind. The yogin must even transcend the state of true reality's not appearing in the manner of being a unity or a multiplicity and the like. To fully rest in the nonappearance of any reference points whatsoever is to realize true reality, here called "the mahāyāna,"another form of that name being "Mahāmudrā." Thus, Jñānakīrti indicates that the final realization of the freedom from reference points even in the mahāyāna of the sūtras is nothing but Mahāmudrā, which he further equates with the famous "nonseeing is the supreme seeing"in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras (he also clarifies that such nonseeing is of course not just the same mere absence of mental nonengagement as when being asleep or closing one's eyes). Finally, compare Jamgön Kongtrul's comments on these two verses in the text with the similar but expanded explanation by the late Nyingma master Düjom Rinpoche (Bdud 'joms 'jigs bral ye shes rdo rje 1991, 183): "Accordingly, after Mind Only has been provisionally taught and then genuinely transcended, the apparitionless Madhyamaka is taught; and when that too has been transcended, the apparitional Madhyamaka is revealed. If that is not reached, it is said that the profound meaning of the greater vehicle is not perceived. It is, in general, erroneous to describe everything expressed by the word mind as the Mind Only doctrine, for there are occasions when the abiding nature free from all extremes, [known] inclusively as the nature of just what is, the genuine goal, the natural nirvāṇa, the expanse of reality, the mind of inner radiance, and the intellect of Samantabhadra, is indicated by the word mind. . . . One should not therefore mistake that which is spoken of as mind-as-such, the inner radiance transcending the mind of saṃsāra and its mental events, for the Mind Only system, which does not transcend consciousness." In general, many Tibetan texts cite the version quoted here in GISM (or variations of it) and comment accordingly. For example, see the Third Karmapa's commentaries on the Dharmadhātustava (Brunnhölzl 2007b, 262) and the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (Brunnhölzl 2012b, 263–64), as well as the Eighth Karmapa's and the Fifth Shamarpa's commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Brunnhölzl 2011b, 88 and 220).
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1846. In accordance with this sentence's paralleling Uttaratantra I.81–82, zag med kyi ye shes is emended to zag med kyi las.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	582. There were two lineage masters between Tugjé Dsöndrü and Dölpopa—Gyalwa Yeshé (Tib. Rgyal ba ye shes; 1257–1320) and Yönten Gyatso (Tib. Yon tan rgya mtsho; 1260–1327)—that are not explicitly mentioned by Tāranātha.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1300. I follow MB °jñānaraśmayaḥ and DP ye shes kyi 'od zer against J °raśmayaḥ.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1193. The translation of I.18bc follows Schmithausen's relating buddhajñānād anuttarāt to avaivartyā, which is confirmed by VT (fol. 11v5) anuttarād buddhajñānād avivartyā āryā bhavanti. However, lines I.18bc could also be read as "Buddha wisdom is unsurpassable. Therefore, the irreversible noble ones . . . ,"which is suggested by DP sang rgyas ye shes bla med phyir / 'phags pa phyir mi ldog pa ni / and RGVV's comments on these lines.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1057. Tib. Nyang bran pa chos kyi ye shes.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1117. J dharmakāyaḥ so 'yam avinirbhāgadharmā 'vinirmuktajñānaguṇo, DP chos kyi sku gang yin pa de ni 'di lta ste . . . de bzhin gshegs pa'i chos dag dang / rnam par dbyer med pa'i chos dang ldan pa ma bral ba'i ye shes kyi yon tan can yin no. Schmithausen 1971 suggests to understand the compound avinirmuktajñāna° as vinirmuktatvena jñānam yeṣām na bhavati ("with which knowing them to be divisible [from the dharmakāya] never happens"). The corresponding passage grol bas shes pa in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra (D45.48, fol. 272b.1) seems to support that (though it should read ma grol bas shes pa, which is instead found for the afflictions, which are actually realized as being divisible). Schmithausen also suggests a second possibility of reading this compound as vinirmuktaṃ jñānaṃ yeṣām na bhavati ("whose realization is not divisible [from the realization of the dharmakāya]"). I follow Schmithausen 1971 and Mathes 2008a in translating "qualities that cannot be realized as being divisible" (which corresponds to how the Śrīmālādevīsūtra uses this phrase). However, guṇa is here in the singular, which seems also how GC (24.15–17) understands it (though taking avinirmuktajñāna to mean "inseparable wisdom"). GC comments that the dharmakāya is endowed with inseparable attributes because they are of the same nature as buddha wisdom. Even at the time of being obscured by the afflictions, it possesses the quality of inseparable wisdom (or the feature of wisdom's being inseparable from it). In brief since the tathāgata heart and its qualities have a connection of identity, the term "kāya" refers to "nature."
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2572. Parts of the Tibetan tradition, such as Sakya Paṇḍita in his Tshad ma rigs gter (Sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan 1992a, 328) and Gorampa's commentary on it (Go bo rab 'byams pa bsod nams seng ge 1979a, 3:281), sometimes present a threefold division of awareness (rig pa): (1) awareness of something other (gzhan rig), (2) self-awareness (rang rig), and (3) awareness of the lack of nature (rang bzhin med par rig pa). The first means that mind is aware of something that seems to be other than itself, such as outer material objects (sense perception and mental perception). The second refers to mind's being aware of itself in a nondual way, that is, without any identifiable difference between mind as the perceiving subject and mind as the perceived object. The third is the direct realization of the true nature of all phenomena, that is, that they are without any nature. Obviously, (1) pertains only to ordinary beings. Awareness (2) is found in both ordinary beings and noble ones (those who directly perceive the nature of phenomena) in a general sense, though the profundity of nondual experience differs. Awareness (3) occurs only in noble beings from the path of seeing onward. It is also called "the wisdom that realizes identitylessness," "yogic valid perception," or "personally experienced wisdom" (Skt. pratyātmavedanīyajñāna, Tib. so so rang rig pa'i ye shes). The latter term emphasizes that this wisdom is one's own unique, immediate, and vivid experience, not just some imagined idea of something one has heard or read of. Mind's realizing the nature of all phenomena includes mind's being aware of its own ultimate nature, which is the unity of awareness and emptiness. The nature of such a realization is to be free from the triad of something that is aware, something of which it is aware, and the act of being aware, while at the same time being an incontrovertible transformative experience in the noble ones' own minds (Skt. pratyātmāryajñāna, Tib. ‘phags pa'i so so rang gi ye shes). The difference between (2) and (3) is reflected in the rather specific Buddhist use of the Sanskrit words svasaṃvid, svasaṃvedana, and svasaṃvitti (all translated into Tibetan as rang rig) for (2), while pratyātmagati, pratyātmādhigama, pratyātmavid, and the latter's derivatives, such as pratyātmavedya and pratyātmavedanīya (all translated into Tibetan as so so rang rig) are used for (3). More literally, pratyātmavedanīyajñāna means "the wisdom of what is to be experienced or realized personally or by oneself (that is, the nature of phenomena)."Of course, there is some overlap in the semantic range of these two groups of words, and, as the examples of Jñānaśrīmitra and two of the Karmapas in the text below show, the words in the first one may also sometimes be used in the second sense. However, the emphasis in the latter group is clearly on one's own firsthand knowledge or experience of something, be it identitylessness, emptiness, or the union of dharmadhātu and awareness (the nature of one's mind). As for the corresponding Tibetan expressions rang rig and so so rang rig, in themselves, they do not mirror this distinction and are often taken to mean just the same. If the Tibetan tradition gives a distinct explanation of the meaning of so so in so so rang rig pa'i ye shes, this is usually done in two ways. First, in the explanation usually preferred by adherents of shentong, so so refers to the fact that the final unmediated realization of the nature of our mind can be accomplished only by this very mind's wisdom and not by anything extrinsic to it, such as a teacher's instructions or blessings. In other words, the only way to really personally know what the wisdom of a buddha or bodhisattva is like is to experience it in our own mind. In this sense, such wisdom is truly inconceivable and incommunicable, which is part of what the term "personally experienced wisdom" indicates, since it is one's very own "private"experience unshared with others. Of course, in this context, it should be clear that "personal" or "private" does not refer to an individual person in the usual sense, since the wisdom of the noble ones encompasses the very realization that there is no such person or self. Nevertheless, it is an experience that occurs only in distinct mind streams that have been trained in certain ways, while it does not happen in others. The second explanation of so so, usually given by adherents of Rangtong, is that, just like a mirror, this wisdom clearly sees all phenomena in a distinct way without mixing them up. Certain Indian and Tibetan masters, such as Jñānaśrīmitra (one of Maitrīpa's teachers), the Seventh Karmapa, and the Eighth Karmapa, use self-awareness and personally experienced awareness/wisdom as equivalents in the sense of this wisdom's representing the most sublime expression of the principle that mind is able to be aware of itself in a nondual way, that is, free from any aspects of subject and object. Jñānaśrīmitra's Sākārasiddhi (in Jñānaśrīmitra, Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali, 478.10–13) says: "In Uttaratantra [I.9, we find] the words ‘the dharma is to be personally experienced.' Since it has been said that false imagination exists, there is no refuge other than self-awareness (uttaratantre ca/ pratyātmavedyo dharmaḥ/ ity evākṣaraṃ/ na cābhutaparikalpo 'stīti bruvataḥ svasaṃvedanād anyāc charaṇam)." Obviously, this kind of self-awareness that is a refuge is to be clearly distinguished from the ordinary notion of self-awareness (2), which basically means that all beings are aware of their own direct experiences, such as being happy or sad. The Seventh Karmapa's Ocean of Texts on Reasoning (Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, 2:163) first equates self-awareness and personal experience in a general way: "Perception (the subject [in question]) is established to be free from conception through self-aware perception itself, because it is experienced through self-awareness as a cognition that does not appear as being suitable or not being suitable to conflate terms and referents. For, every person's conceptions that are based on apprehending names and referents as being suitable to be conflated are to be experienced personally by the experiencer that is self-awareness."Later, the Karmapa (ibid., 2:338) also identifies the personally experienced wisdom of a buddha's omniscience as an instance of self-awareness: "It is not contradictory for awareness to be what it is aware of. For, when this awareness knows the minds of others, it must be aware of knowing itself, and the wisdom of the knowledge of all aspects is [also] a personal experience of itself." In this vein, the Eighth Karmapa's Lamp says (19–20, 21, and 41): "The [cognizing] subject that is the type of realization that realizes this very [dharmakāya] does not depend on any other hosts of reference points, but is self-awareness by nature. Therefore, by virtue of this self-awareness's being pure through its very [own] purity, it is not dependent on anything else," and "the great Mādhyamika, venerable Asaṅga, holds that [during the vajra-like samādhi] at the end of the path of familiarization, in this very mind stream that will become a buddha and in which tathāgatahood abides, remedial self-awareness dawns and thus everything to be relinquished [at this point] is relinquished without exception," and "liberation is to have attained the mastery of self-aware wisdom over the sugata heart of one's own mind stream." In addition, the Lamp repeatedly identifies the realization of buddhahood as being self-awareness and self-arisen.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	596. Tib. Bdud 'joms 'jigs bral ye shes rdo rje.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1101. Tib. ye shes gzhan stong
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1230. DP "tathāgata wisdom" (de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes).
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1051. Tib. Ye shes rdo rje dpal bzang po.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	982. These five are Dogden Jampel Gyatso (Tib. Rtogs ldan 'jam dpal rgya mtsho; 1356–1428), Paso Chökyi Gyaltsen (Tib. Ba so chos kyi rgyal mtshan; 1402–1473), Drubchog Chökyi Dorje (Tib. Grub mchog chos kyi rdo rje, aka Dben sa myon pa—"The Crazy One from Wensa"; born fifteenth century), Wensapa Lobsang Tönyö Trubpa (Tib. Dben sa pa blo bzang don yod grub pa; 1504/1505–1565/1566), and Sangyé Yeshé (Tib. Sangs rgyas ye shes; 1525–1591). This transmission is called "Ganden ear-whispered lineage" or "Wensa ear-whispered lineage." Note though that the Paṇchen Lama's text does not mention Tsongkhapa as the origin of these Mahāmudrā teachings but says that they are the system of Chökyi Dorje. In fact, the members and contents of the short and long lineages of this transmission as presented here appear to have been established only at the time of Yeshé Gyaltsen (Tib. Ye shes rgyal mtshan; 1713–1797).
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1857. CMW ye shes kyi emended to ye shes kyis.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1375. Ibid., fol. 242a.5–7. The passage in "[ ]" is from this sūtra (de snying rje chen po'i sems skyes nas sems can thams cad yongs su bskyab pa'i phyir zag pa zad pa'i ye shes 'dris par byas pa las sems can rnams la lta bas phyir phyogs te / slar log nas so so'i skye bo'i sa na yang kun du snang ngo /). It seems that both the Sanskrit and DP are missing something here since the first part of this paragraph up through "in order to protect all sentient beings" is clearly an (unfinished) quotation, while the remainder is a further explanation of this quotation.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2741. Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā XII.3. Rin chen ye shes 2010 omits the fourth line and has "children of the victors"instead of "victors"in the second line.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	333. Tib. Ye shes 'byung gnas.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	222. Tib. Ye shes sde.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	291. Tib. Ye shes sde.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1420. With DP (chugs pa med pa thogs pa med pa'i ye shes kyi gzigs pa mnga ba'i de bzhin gshegs pa), I take asaṅgāpratihataprajñājñānadarśanam as a bahuvrīhi compound qualifying tathāgatatvam.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1858. CMW ye shes kyi shes pa emended to ye shes kyis shes pa.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	993. Bdud 'joms 'jigs bral ye shes rdo rje 1991, 191–205.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1226. DP "wisdom of the noble ones" ( 'phags pa'i ye shes).
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1847. CMW ye shes kyi rtog pas emended to ye shes kyis rtog pa'i.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	597. For details on Düjom Rinpoche's position on rangtong and shentong or coarse outer Madhyamaka and subtle inner Madhyamaka (or Great Madhyamaka), as well as buddha nature, see Bdud 'joms 'jigs bral ye shes rdo rje 1991, 162–216. Though he advocates the superiority of Great Madhyamaka to some degree, he also discusses the complementarity of rangtong and shentong as well as that of the second and third dharma wheels.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1523. DP gnas yongs su gyur pa 'jig rten las 'das pa rnam par mi rtog pa dang / de'i rjes la thob pa ye shes kyi rgyu can bral ba'i 'bras bu'i ming can gnas yongs su gyur ba'i rgyu yin. The general Buddhist abhidharma lists five types of results: (1) matured results, (2) dominated results, (3) results that accord with their cause, (4) results caused by persons, and (5) results of freedom (or separation). The latter is defined as "the exhaustion or relinquishment of the specific factors to be relinquished through the force of the remedy that is prajñā." Thus, in the general abhidharma, a result of freedom is defined as an absence of factors to be relinquished and thus is an unconditioned nonentity (while the other four results are conditioned entities). A nonentity is defined as "what is not able to perform a function,"but here as well as elsewhere in the Uttaratantra and RGVV, it is made clear many times that buddhahood, despite being unconditioned and a result of freedom, is able to perform the functions of accomplishing the welfare of all sentient beings and so on. The entire fourth chapter is ample testimony to that, representing the detailed answer to the question in RGVV's introduction to IV.13ff (J99), "It has been declared that buddhahood is characterized by being without arising and without ceasing. How is it then that from this unconditioned buddhahood, which has the characteristic of lacking functionality, effortless, uninterrupted, and nonconceptual buddha activity manifests functionality for as long as the world lasts?"In addition, Uttaratantra II.18– 20 describes enlightened activity in terms of eternal space-like buddhahood's being the cause for others experiencing pure objects of their six sense faculties. II.38–41 on the topic "manifestation"speaks about the undifferentiable space-like dharmadhātu's making efforts in accomplishing the liberation of beings through all kinds of appearances, thus being the cause for introducing beings to the path and maturing them. When introducing this topic, RGVV (J85) says, "Now, this tathāgatahood manifests as being inseparable from its unconditioned qualities, just like space. Nevertheless, since it is endowed with unique attributes, one should see that it, through its particular applications of inconceivable great means, compassion, and prajñā and by way of the three stainless kāyas (svābhāvika[kāya], sāmbhogika[kāya], and nairmāṇika[kāya]), manifests as the cause that brings about the benefit and happiness of beings in an uninterrupted, endless, and effortless manner for as long as [saṃsāric] existence lasts."RGVV on I.7 (J8) explicitly affirms that unconditioned buddhahood entails enlightened activity: "Even though it is unconditioned and has the characteristic of being inactive, from tathāgatahood all activities of the perfect Buddha unfold without effort in an unimpeded and uninterrupted manner until the end of saṃsāra." In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra repeatedly emphasizes that the full revelation or manifestation of the tathāgata heart as buddhahood automatically entails the performance of buddha activity as its main characteristic, thus "describing a tathāgata primarily in terms of dynamic activity" (Zimmermann 2002, 65). Furthermore, SM 8c says that "suchness operates in accordance (anuvṛtti) with the welfare [of beings]."Yamabe (1997, n. 32) also refers to "the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun (Taishō 31, 581c5–8), which states that all the actions of the buddhas arise on the basis of the *asaṃskṛta-dharmakāya."
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	2416. RGVV (DP) gnas yongs su gyur pa 'jig rten las 'das pa rnam par mi rtog pa dang / de'i rjes la thob pa ye shes kyi rgyu can bral ba'i 'bras bu'i ming can gnas yongs su gyur ba'i rgyu yin. In RGVV, the whole paragraph beginning with this sentence belongs to the topic of the function (and not the fruition) of awakening, which—as HLS agrees—is only explained in Uttaratantra II.18–28, as being the function of twofold wisdom.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	769. Tib. Sne'u zur pa ye shes 'bar.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	326. Interestingly, the biography of Ra Lotsāwa Dorje Tra (Tib. Rva lo tsā ba rdo rje grags; born 1016) states that Ngog Lotsāwa, together with Dsen Kawoché, Nyen Lotsāwa Tarmatra (Tib. Gnyan lo tsā ba dar ma grags), and others had already studied the treatises of Maitreya with paṇḍita Prajñāna, a teacher of Dsen, at the dharma council at Toling (Tib. Tho gling) organized by King Dsedé (Tib. Rtse lde) in 1076. Rva Ye shes seng ge, Mthu stobs dbang phyug rje btsun rwa lo tsā ba'i rnam par thar pa kun khyab snyan pa'i rnga sgra (Zi ling: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1989), 206.2–8. According to this, the Uttaratantra and the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga would have been known already at least in the Toling area in western Tibet before they were transmitted to Dsen and Ngog by Sajjana.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	387. Tib. Nyang bran pa chos kyi ye shes.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	608. Tib. Rta nag pa rin chen ye shes.
When the Clouds Part	{{#arraymap: Asaṅga;Maitreya;Brunnhölzl, K.	;	@@@	@@@	}}	1586. DP omit "vision" (°nidarśanāc) and say "the wisdom of liberation that sees all objects to be known" (shes bya'i don kun gzigs pa'i grol ba'i ye shes).